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José Medina Echavarria 
What will be the future of democracy in 
Latin America? Medina Echavarria 
suggests an answer to this question based 
on an analysis of the controversy that in 
recent years has been waged in the 
European countries with respect to the 
prospects for their democracies. He does 
not think, of course, that their political 
processes are automatically reproduced in 
Latin America, but that in view of the 
similarity of certain conditions and prob-
lems, and the reciprocal contact main-
tained, some solutions are likely to be 
similar too. 
After a rapid glance at authoritari-
anism and technocracy, the subject of the 
expansion of State intervention is intro-
duced- via an analysis of hypotheses 
advanced by Heilbroner and Bell Hence 
Medina Echavarria penetrates to the heart 
of the matter -the crisis of democracy, as 
interpreted by conservative, liberal and 
marxist opinion; and he ends by applying 
the hypotheses in question to Latin 
America. In this last section, he alludes in 
particular to the relations between demo-
cracy and economic development, to the 
overload of demands and to the legitima-
cy of the principles of democracy, con-
cluding with a reasonably optimistic 
hypothesis as to the future of democracy 
in the Latin American countries. 
Following the article comments are 
included that were made to the author by 
colleagues from CEPAL and ILPES in the 
course of an internal seminar. 
•Consultant, Social Development Division, 
CEPAL. 
I. 
Motives of concern in 
Latin America 
1. De facto situations and their 
interpretation 
For the moment our sole concern is to 
record a de facto situation. According to 
the observers of Latin American political 
life -whatever their motivation- it 
would seem, to judge from the number 
and importance of the countries reviewed, 
that what virtually predominates in the 
region is a form of government described 
as authoritarian. True, the adjective does 
not give a precise idea of the shades of 
difference exhibited. There can be such a 
thing as power vigorously wielded which 
nevertheless does not merit such an 
epithet when it refrains from over-
stepping the constitutional faculties of a 
representative regime. The term authori-
tarianism therefore refers to the exercise 
of that stronger authority more or less to 
the exclusion of popular participation in 
public decision-making. 
The fact once noted, its interpreta-
tion must follow: whether purely func-
tional and scientific in intention, or 
guided by value judgements and put 
forward as a justification or a repudia-
tion. How far the first of these ap-
proaches is strictly possible is of course a 
dubious question, which need not be 
touched upon for the moment. 
What is of interest is merely to 
observe that the current interpretations 
are of two types, although not always 
mutually exclusive. One imputes the 
existence of authoritarianism to the defi-
ciencies of the institutional system at a 
given moment, whether they are to be 
found in the political constitution itself 
or in its operational mechanisms, in 
particular the political parties. For some, 
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however, these negative factors in the 
political structure have become crucial 
when the State determined by that struc-
ture has had to face up to the tasks of 
modernizing the economy. In other 
words, the institutional defects have 
obtruded themselves when the time has 
come to attempt import-substituting 
industrialization or to advance beyond 
it. Consequently, the initially strictly 
political interpretation, without forgoing 
its political character, comes to coincide 
or merge with the purely or primarily 
economic interpretation in which inter-
est is focused on the production and 
distribution systems; or, to put it more 
exactly, on economic development. And 
in this context the thesis commonly 
propounded is that economically back-
ward countries cannot make up their 
leeway by following the democratic 
countries' traditional paths, and that 
they are therefore bound to pass through 
a period of authoritarianism, whether it 
results from a mobilization process set 
afoot by a doctrinaire group or a charis-
matic personality, or from an increase in 
the decision-making capacity of the 
executive sector of the hereditary State. 
The second alternative emerges as the 
more acceptable when it is contended 
that the intervention of the representa-
tive elements maintained by the State 
has been incapable of settling the con-
flicts of interests that are always stirred 
up by economic development, and that 
in default of the indispensable adoption 
of decisions, policy-making has been 
perpetually left to drift on a rudderless 
course. 
Clearly, as the character of the 
authoritarian State varies from one coun-
try to another, both interpretations, if 
they are to be valid, must be completed 
by a detailed analysis of the historical 
and social processes that have taken 
place in each case. But sometimes the 
sociological explanation may try to 
simplify this diversity by classifying 
structural conditions under types, as has 
been done from thestandpoint of the 
dependency theory. However, these or 
other details in the content of the 
interpretation make no difference to the 
blunt contrast, in general outline, 
between the explanations offered. For 
the time being this is all that matters. 
2. Moot questions 
It is worth while to note at least that in 
the interpretations under discussion two 
questions remain ambiguous or problem-
atic. In the first place, a government 
described as authoritarian is generally 
spoken of as technocratic too. The 
problematic element consists in the fact 
that the predominance of technocratic 
procedure is usually linked by the 
theorists of advanced capitalism with an 
extreme degree of economic concentra-
tion, and is therefore unlikely to be 
found where such concentration is much 
less intense. Should this prove to be a 
fallacy, a different explanation for the 
existence of technocratic tendencies 
would have to be sought. Again, the 
assertion that a government is authori-
tarian says nothing in principle of the 
extent of its intervention either in the 
economic or in the social field; what is 
more, authoritarian States can be cited 
which emphatically affirm that their 
activity is of a strictly subsidiary nature. 
Is this the fact, or even really possible? 
Generally speaking, the question to be 
asked in this connexion is whether every 
authoritarian position demands more 
extensive interventionism or, conversely, 
whether every increase in interven-
tionism entails the authoritarian form of 
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government described above. A question 
which has an important bearing on some-
The de facto situation of a region in 
which, as has been said, authoritarian 
forms of government prevail may be the 
starting-point for a number of widely 
varying theses. In the present attempt to 
scan the future, the intention is not to 
weigh on their own merits the potential 
alternatives for the duration of these 
authoritarian regimes, but to examine 
their possibilities of continuity and 
change in relation to the vitality of the 
traditional political patterns of demo-
cracy in the countries outside the region 
which have the closest cultural contacts 
and connexions with those of Latin 
America. In a word, what is the presum-
able outlook for the great industrial 
democracies in the near future? 
In the case of a prognosis of this 
type, two essential points should be 
clarified beforehand. In the first place, it 
does not postulate a type of determinism 
of which the mere enunciation would 
show it to be erroneous. That is, there is 
no question of believing a priori that 
what happens in one direction or 
another in the experience of the great 
capitalist democracies must necessarily 
be reproduced completely, and without 
modification, in the political systems of 
the Latin American countries, or that 
the reactions of the latter can take no 
other form than imitation or immediate 
reflex. All that is postulated is greater 
interdependence and reciprocal contact 
among a number of countries undergoing 
thing that will soon become obvious in 
what follows. 
similar processes, and the consequent 
spread of similar conditions throughout 
the whole group as the solution of their 
problems makes for stabilization. Thus 
nothing forced or purely mechanical is 
involved. The second essential is to 
clarify the raison d'etre of certain pro-
pensities in futurological research. The 
aim of such research is to anticipate 
trends and formulate projections of 
every kind, and great importance is of 
course attached to those of a strictly 
technological character; but undoubted-
ly its keenest concern is for the future 
lot of humanity, and accordingly for the 
extent to which the values that are still 
considered essential to civilization are 
destined to flourish or to founder. The 
horizon of the human condition could 
be the predominance of absolute dicta-
torship, but it is not denied in principle 
that man may be capable of conserving, 
in differing degrees, the liberal and 
democratic elements to which he still 
aspires, whatever the picture presented 
by the technological scaffolding and the 
economic structures which it largely 
determines. And although no forecast 
can disregard the real trends of the 
material factors -as will next be shown-
it is equally true that a task of this sort is 
meaningless unless its ultimate objective 
is to presage what may become of 
human life with all its aspirations and 
sufferings. Will it be possible for liberal 
democracy to survive in economic and 
II. 
Medium-term situation in the 
western countries 
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technical conditions very different from 
those hitherto prevailing? The question 
retains its theoretical validity as a prob-
lem, whatever pessimists or optimists 
may feel about it. 
Nobody can think it unjustifiable 
that declared anxiety about the effica-
cious operation of democracy should 
exist in certain countries whose history 
has hitherto marked them out as models 
of democratic practice and doctrine. 
This anxiety itself indicates that it must 
stem from people with a manifest 
interest in preserving democracy; that is, 
from intellectuals and politicians who in 
this sense reveal themselves as conserva-
tive, since the flaws and impending 
dangers they point out, the limitations 
and perils they denounce, are not alto-
gether attributable to a doctrinally un-
favourable angle of vision. In the present 
article it was thought best to begin by 
methodically seeking the support of 
studies written in a conservative spirit, 
although at the appropriate stage due 
attention must be paid to left-wing 
criticisms, including those of both the 
traditional and the so-called "new" left, 
sometimes more stimulating than the 
former in its vagaries. What is the view 
taken of the "governability" of the great 
capitalist democracies over the medium 
term? An expression which is far 
from self-explanatory, and consequently 
somewhat infelicitous. For the point to 
be ascertained is not whether demo-
cracies lend themselves little or hardly at 
all to being governed -by whom, in this 
case? - but rather whether the countries 
that have long been living under a 
democratic regime can be more effi-
ciently governed than at present. What is 
being tacitly asked is whether in such 
countries a stronger government can or 
cannot be looked for; which implies, to 
put it the other way round, that in them 
the reins of government are slack or not 
held, firmly enough. What are the reasons 
underlying this bloodlessness on the part 
of authority and the consequent demand 
that it be given a stiffening tonic? This 
was the line taken in a joint study by a 
"Trilateral Commission" - a title justi-
fied by the aim of exploring the problem 
on what are obviously its three most 
decisive fronts: the United States, 
Europe and Japan. The adoption of the 
text in question as a basis or point of 
departure at this stage of the present 
essay seems recommendable not only on 
account of those dimensions and the 
personal prestige of its authors, but also 
—as was said before— because their 
position is conservative rather than revo-
lutionary. In their study, as in others like 
it, the future viability of democracy is 
repeatedly linked with economic devel-
opment. Accordingly, before entering 
upon a somewhat more detailed exami-
nation of tixe subject, attention should 
be drawn to a common premise which in 
these pages too is definitely an under-
lying hypothesis: the assumption that 
over the medium term a convulsion of 
the capitalist world even comparable to 
the traumatic crisis of the year 1930 
does not appear to be likely. Expressed 
in positive terms, the hypothesis sup-
ports the certainty that for the next 
twenty-five years at least the system will 
still be capable of sustained growth, as 
maintained in the recent report by 
W. Leontief. 
Given such a hypothesis, however 
formulated, the following are the two 
most general forecasts which must rea-
sonably be taken into account. It is 
expected, on the one hand, that during 
the next few years all the countries of 
the West will experience a steady expan-
sion of State intervention in the eco-
nomic field; and that in the political 
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field, for these and other reasons, the 
traditional democratic regime will be 
faced with serious challenges, not, how-
ever, different in kind from those they 
have already encountered in recent 
times. The next step is to consider, in 
very concise outline, the principal points 
at issue. 
1. Expansion of State intervention 
Setting any revolutionary position 
entirely aside, from relatively conserva-
tive points of view the theory of the 
increasing expansion of State inter-
ventionism in economic life is nowadays 
presented mainly through two kinds of 
analysis, if not incompatible, at least 
based on different lines of argument. 
(a) Increased planning requirements 
The first, represented by R. L. 
Heilbroner, asserts that if the continuity 
of the "business civilization" is to be 
maintained in the next few years, 
planning will be called upon to play an 
increasingly predominant role. For over 
the medium term all the capitalist eco-
nomies will predictably have to cope 
with certain problems: (i) correction of 
the generalized distortions that they 
tend to produce; (ii) correction, likewise, 
of other distortions or disturbances of a 
localized type; and (iii) reaction to the 
threats that are making themselves felt in 
the natural environment. How these ines-
capable planning requirements -and the 
consequently stronger influence of the 
State on economic life- will affect the 
democratic system of government is a 
matter that Heilbroner does not discuss. 
The only point of interest to us at the 
moment is his basic contention, in 
response to other more conservative poli-
ticians and intellectuals, that if the capi-
talism of today is to survive the only 
course open to it is to step up planning. 
Through what political mechanisms this 
can be done does not seem to be of 
immediate concern to him; which 
perhaps allows one to assume that the 
expansion of State intervention can be 
effected through democratic institutions. 
For the moment this is all we need take 
into consideration; and accordingly it is 
unnecessary to go into what the author 
thinks about the more distant future of 
the system, unless it be to note that even 
in face of the possibility of its complete 
transformation he reaffirms, not without 
a touch of melancholy, the value repre-
sented by the autonomy of the indivi-
dual as the supreme value of western 
tradition. 
(b) The State as Public Household 
This same futurological conclusion 
that State intervention will presumably 
be expanded in time to come is also 
reached by another economist, notori-
ously conservative or right-wing, via a 
very original and suggestive analysis. We 
refer to Daniel Bell, confronted in his 
turn with the supposed crisis of capi-
talism. There is nothing new about such 
a presumption, since for years past 
currency has been given to different 
versions of the idea that limits must be 
set to the autonomy of the economic 
system -as if that were the only social 
system in existence- and that it must be 
subordinated to non-economic values 
which man's moral consciousness rates 
more highly. Nor, in the empirical 
account, is there anything original in the 
assertion that the system in question, 
while capable of regulating fairly effi-
ciently the public or private interests 
subject to market mechanisms, is a 
broken reed as regards the maintenance 
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of public services for the benefit of other 
legitimate human interests, which, how-
ever, cannot be exactly measured in 
terms of the mechanisms aforesaid. The 
intellectual appeal of Bell's reflexions on 
these issues consists in the undeniable 
plasticity of this approach. In a work 
written earlier than the one of most 
concern to us at present, when exam-
ining the contemporary operation of the 
"corporations" lie had already shown 
through them the tension between what 
he called "economizing and sociologizing 
modes": a tension easily generalizable to 
the system as a whole. What this meant 
was that the purely economic concern 
for productivity found its compensation 
and its curb in the sociological concern 
for the effects produced on human 
relationships. Historically, indeed, this 
tension indicates that the advance of 
such sociologization implies as its inevi-
table outcome -not always consciously 
sought— the insertion of the economic 
system in a broader social system, geared 
to objectives different from its own (a 
line of thought which E. Heimann might 
have followed up in order to demon-
strate his fundamental postulates). 
But for our present point -the ever-
increasing intervention of the State in 
economic life- greater interest attaches 
to a chapter in Bell's controversial book 
in which, taking as a basis an old and 
almost unknown article by J. Schumpeter, 
he shows the ineluctability of that 
expansion (besides dealing with other no 
less vital topics) by disclosing the real 
nature of the contemporary State as a 
fiscal system, as the articulation of a 
country's Public Household. This is not 
the place to enter into the details of the 
argument or to appraise its originality or 
validity. The family household was the 
sole economic object of the classic world 
(Aristóteles), and M. Weber had devoted 
a long chapter to the household system 
as that corresponding to the Oikos eco-
nomy -predominantly natural- which 
was widely prevalent in the past, prior, 
of course, to the domination of one or 
other form of capitalism. The Public 
Household - a term which up to a short 
time ago was still currently applied in 
Europe to the fiscal system- came into 
being with the modern State and at its 
service. But even its continual expansion 
did not overstep the bounds self-imposed 
by the State in relation to the liberal 
economic system: a system which, if it 
met individual needs or wishes, did so 
through their spontaneous satisfaction 
within the play of market forces. But the 
increasing complexity of contemporary 
life compelled the State not only to look 
after the viability of the market 
-maintaining capital accumulation as an 
essential requirement- but to cope with 
the various individual or group demands, 
fostered by cultural incentives, which in 
principle could not be satisfied through 
the market In this sense the State as a 
country's Public Household considerably 
increases in volume, running the risk of 
bankruptcy if it does not properly 
balance its budget. The problem of the 
present-day State is that it cannot shelve 
the twofold function which has been 
imposed upon it in the course of history: 
to continue co-ordinating the economic 
system -keeping up the capital accumu-
lation it needs— and to satisfy in one 
way or another the snowballing needs 
and wants of individuals and social 
groups that fall within its own sphere. 
The curious thing about these new de-
mands is that they increasingly assume 
the guise of quasi-legal claims -or, if 
preferred, entitlements- which are so 
manifold and so conflicting that they 
can be met only by strictly political 
decisions. It will not be surprising to find 
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this point cropping up in all analyses of 
present-day democracy. 
How much all this may be worth as a 
symptom of a contradiction in the eco-
nomic system and on account of its 
repercussions on the dilemmas of devel-
opment is, like the political solution 
proposed by our author - a restoration 
of liberalism- a question outside the 
scope of the present article. Our sole 
object was to discover once again, in the 
opinions of another economist, the pre-
dictions of the one previously cited: the 
foreseeability of an expansion of State 
interventionism in the near future in the 
great industrial democracies. But some 
reference cannot be omitted -since the 
topic has become an obsession in the 
thinking of the New Left, and given that 
allusion has already been made to the 
assumed tension between the economic 
and sociological approaches— to the fact 
that for Bell one of the most crucial 
dilemmas of the new State as Public 
Household is that posed by the relation 
between efficiency and equity: how it 
will be possible to increase a society's 
productive capacity and at the same 
time restrict or limit certain types of con-
sumption. The principle of equity also 
pertains to the liberal current of 
thought, touched upon likewise by 
Heilbroner from his personal standpoint. 
Let us now come to the other element in 
the prognosis which appears alongside 
the expansion of State activity; they 
might in principle be regarded as inde-
pendent, although in practice this is not 
so. 
2. Breakup of democracy 
The presumption is that in the imme-
diate future there will be a "Crisis of 
Democracy" (the title of the report 
mentioned above) in the major countries 
which for the time being maintain that 
political regime; but the term crisis must 
be taken in its strictly etymological 
sense, as meaning a particular stage in 
the evolution of a system which is 
marked by sufficient symptoms of vacil-
lation and disturbance to indicate a state 
of transition, ruling out neither the 
recovery and reinvigoration of the 
system or its final disintegration and 
collapse. At the same time, this crisis 
merely represents the prolongation into 
the future of difficulties already observ-
able in the immediate past, and therefore 
at the present day. 
(a) Conservative interpretation 
For the purpose of analysing the 
crisis and the existing predictions it will 
be useful to resort to a classification, as 
defective as any other, but an adequate 
basis for orderly presentation of the 
subject-matter. Those whose concern is 
focused on the breakup of present and 
future democracy can be grouped 
around three kinds of attitudes and 
motivations, conservative, predomi-
nantly liberal or coloured by radical 
negativism. The report of the Trilateral 
Commission falls especially into the first 
group, in the context of a technically 
functional theory. This position attri-
butes the crisis of democracy to four 
main factors or causes which may be 
summed up beforehand as follows: 
(i) institutional distortions; (ii) the over-
load of demands on the State induced by 
the theory and the actual development 
of democratic tradition; (iii) supposedly 
functional connexions with economic 
development; and lastly (iv) the shrinking 
of territorial spheres of influence in face 
of the various forms of global inter-
dependence in the contemporary world, 
above all in its economic sector. The 
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presence of these factors can be demon-
strated in each and all of the countries 
under consideration, although it must be 
stated at once that great differences exist 
from one country to another for struc-
tural reasons or on account of political 
traditions. This point should be borne in 
mind to obviate the need for repetition, 
except where it is particularly appro-
priate. 
(i) Institutional distortions 
The proposition respecting institu-
tional distortions is the least novel, 
inasmuch as for some time now atten-
tion has been insistently called to one or 
other of the forms they take: to the 
relations between the legislative and 
executive powers, to the inefficient oper-
ation of the political parties, and to the 
uncertainties of the average citizen's 
electoral behaviour vis-á-vis the parties in 
question. For years past stress has been 
laid on the technical weakness of any 
type of Parliament, over against the 
Executive and its administrative institu-
tions, whose greater technical and 
scientific knowledge and training means 
that they have very little difficulty in 
imposing their basic decisions in the 
shape of proposals and bills. In face of 
this de facto situation various solutions 
have been put forward, ranging from the 
establishment of technical commissions 
at the service of the legislators, to 
continually renewed projects for the 
representation of professional interest, 
either parallel to or in association with 
the political Parliament. As regards the 
parties, attention has over and over again 
been drawn to their lack of representa-
tiveness, their imperviousness to the 
conflicts of social demands, which pre-
vents them from fulfilling the function 
which in modern terminology is de-
scribed as 'articulation of interests' (so 
that there is a want of relation and 
proportion between the political 'inputs' 
of the population and the products and 
results of legislative decisions). New Left 
criticism in its extremer forms takes the 
view that the parties and the Parliament 
are only a deferential instrument, but 
that nevertheless they play an important 
role, inasmuch as they constitute in 
practice the necessary nuclei for legiti-
mization of the system. Conservative 
comment confines itself to describing 
the dwindling attraction exercised by the 
parties over the electorate, above all 
when in their tactical coalitions they can 
be seen to differ only from electoral 
motives and over trivial questions of 
immediate topical interest (denoted by 
gallup polls), not because of decisive 
stands taken in confrontations on major 
national issues. We must repeat that the 
situation varies from one country to 
another. For instance, the Administra-
tion may dominate the Parliament to a 
greater or lesser degree (extreme cases, 
Italy and France); in this respect, how-
ever, matters may be complicated by 
internal divisions in the Chambers of 
Deputies themselves with regard to the 
Presidential office, as in recent years in 
the United States, where the 'imperial' 
Presidency of former times has given 
place to the manacled authority of more 
recent days. The failure of political 
leaders to carry conviction or kindle 
enthusiasm and the apathy or wavering 
allegiance of the electorate are primarily 
attributed to these circumstances, which 
are perhaps to be seen as temporary in 
some parts of the world or as deriving 
from what seems functionally to be the 
result of a 'blocked society'. Blocked, 
that is, by the major administrative 
bodies. 
(ii) The overload of demands 
Many observers of the faulty opera-
tion of present-day democracy agree in 
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pointing out, in different terms, how one 
of the main factors in the crisis is what 
some call the overload of demands that a 
democratic government takes on its 
shoulders: demands, that is, for State 
contributions and assistance. Such an 
imputation is not so much merely un-
clear as equivocal. An increase in the 
volume of claims or requests with which 
State action is faced is by no means the 
heritage of democratic government 
alone; the same thing happens under any 
other form of government, in so far as 
such demands are the result of the 
intensified complexity of social life —of 
its technological postulates- and of the 
similarly increasing opacity it presents as 
a whole. The authoritarian States are by 
no means exempt from the pressures of 
this overload. 
In the countries with a tradition of 
liberal democracy the existence of such 
an overload would seem perfectly expli-
cable and natural, since it is nothing but 
the historical development of the very 
principles by which such regimes are 
upheld. The aspirations they necessarily 
encourage have gradually swelled as the 
people have come to see many of their 
ambitions as increasingly realizable. 
Better care of health, for example, is 
fostered by the progress of medicine 
itself, and this highlights the injustice 
implied by its limitation to certain 
sectors. Nevertheless, in the countries in 
question the allegation of the overload 
of demands barely conceals awareness of 
a deep-rooted inconsistency in the values 
underlying their centuries of civilization: 
the inconsistency represented by radical 
individualism. The individual was envis-
aged as the responsible centre of all 
activity —not only economic activity— 
who in order to exercise it needed only 
the guarantees extended by a remote and 
neutral State. This is not the place to 
review the long history of the various 
episodes which have removed the 
complete fulfilment of this ideal farther 
and farther out of reach, although it is 
still rightly believed that no civilization 
is conceivable which would really 
attempt to turn its back upon the only 
forces that are genuinely creative —those 
of the individual. But any digression into 
the cultural field, however condensed, is 
to be avoided here. 
In the empirical analysis of the diffi-
culties of a democratic government, in 
face of the excessive quantity of requests 
addressed to it, further emphasis needs 
to be laid on two aspects of the question 
already reviewed or well-known. In 
reality, given the enormous distance 
between the concrete individual and the 
abstract State, the demands made by the 
former upon the latter call for the 
interposition of regulatory and inter-
mediary mechanisms capable of judging 
each claim according to its weightiness 
and importance. But without going 
farther - to the point, for example, of 
assessing the value of the old Durkheimian 
idea respecting the need for corps inter-
médiaires— the question for the moment 
is to remedy the shortcomings of the 
existing instruments of adjustment, in 
particular the political parties -not to 
mention other professional associations— 
in the performance of their principal 
task: the necessary articulation and bal-
ance of the multiplicity of interests pre-
sent at any given moment in the life of a 
society, so as to make them viable in due 
course. It may be that the supposed 'over-
load1 is created more often than not by the 
deluge of interests that makes it impossible 
to discharge such a function. In this sense, 
the obvious problem posed by excessive 
demand is of an institutional character, 
and therefore can be dealt with by means 
of appropriate institutional reforms. 
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The other aspect of this menacing 
overload is perhaps more serious: the 
fact that today many group and indi-
vidual demands ('needs' and 'wants') are 
peremptorily presented as quasi-legal 
claims, which, transcending the principle 
of equality of opportunities predicated 
at the start, in reality call for actual 
equality of benefits, and thus trigger off 
that rising revolution of entitlements of 
which one of the above-mentioned 
authors has spoken. Problems created by 
distribution of these entitlements on a 
quota basis have been typical of the 
situation in the United States, and not in 
that country alone. And it is a more 
serious matter than in the preceding 
instance, because the possible solution 
does not lie in the revitalization of 
familiar institutions, but in a new consti-
tutional delimitation of the scope of 
old-time liberalism. This is why the topic 
is of concern to current trends in resto-
rationist thinking, which is striving to 
identify and define what the past can 
show us that is still valid today. For 
reluctance to accede to the promptings 
of this line of thought would leave only 
one alternative: simply to accept the 
interpretations of some neo-marxists 
who declare, in a complicated 'function-
alist' theory, that it is typical of the 
democratic forms of advanced capitalism 
('late' in their terminology), to pursue a 
'preventive' policy in relation to the 
crisis, whereby priorities among these 
social demands are in effect assigned 
technocratically, and those that do not 
jeopardize the viability of the system are 
left to take their chance (Claus Ogge). 
This is a position which up to a point is 
in accord with the conservative thesis 
regarding the overload of demands on 
the present-day State, without, however, 
offering possibilities of a truly demo-
cratic way out. It will be shown that the 
liberal thinkers who start from the inevi-
tability —even the desirability— of the 
conflict between the various require-
ments stimulated by the social environ-
ment itself are bound, of course, to 
devote special attention to this point. 
In practice, the problem of the 
superabundance of claims with which 
the democratic State has to cope repre-
sents a sociologically inescapable situa-
tion, which cannot be dealt with by 
silencing or arbitrarily curtailing some of 
them. Nor, indeed, could an authori-
tarian State attempt such a solution 
without incurring the corresponding 
risks. 
In theoretical discussion the subject 
of the overload of petitions from the 
various social units —individuals or 
groups— sometimes takes paradoxical 
forms or directions. For in this con-
nexion the crisis of democracy can be 
interpreted as an 'excess' of democracy. 
And in contrast with the classic postu-
late that its ills can only be cured by 
more democracy, some contemporary 
functional analyses see amputation as 
the sole remedy. Not, of course, saying 
so in such forthright terms, but demon-
strating the existence of dysfunctional 
elements in the democratic organization, 
which give grounds for assertions as to 
how and in what degree this type of 
political system often requires, for its 
effective maintenance, a modicum of 
political apathy and indifference. Is 
there an exactly measurable distance 
between a democracy of limited effec-
tiveness and an authoritarian govern-
ment? For the issue here is not the 
greater or lesser volume of demand that 
may paralyse a government's decision-
making process, but the whole essence of 
democracy as political participation. 
It would be by no means easy to 
formulate and prescribe appropriate 
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remedies if the cyclical process allegedly 
observable in a specific country were to 
prove a reality: a process whereby every 
increase in 'participation' would ulti-
mately lead to a polarization of society, 
which in its turn would conduce to 
political apathy and indifference, thus 
creating situations of which the upshot 
would be a widespread perception of the 
inefficiency of political action. Func-
tionalism has its surprises. 
If, then, the argument is not to lead 
directly to an authoritarian position, it 
leaves, regretfully perhaps, no other way 
out than the corrective consisting in a 
permanent line of defence of a techno-
cratic character, capable of breaking 
down the alarming repetition of the 
aforesaid cyclical process. But the domi-
nation of technocracy, to which other 
tendencies of the social structure are 
conducive, is exactly what is considered 
inadmissible from the standpoint of the 
traditional postulate of popular political 
intervention on a majority basis. 
(iii) Democracy and development 
During the 1960s, sociologists in 
several of the Western countries dili-
gently bent their attention upon a social 
phenomenon which some were bold 
enough to describe as new or unprece-
dented, although there were variations in 
the terminology in which they attempted 
to pin it down. They pointed out that in 
all the industrial countries of the West an 
egalitarian trend was gradually advancing 
which, while by no means fully compre-
hensive —embracing status, income and 
culture—, was already bringing the 
various social classes and strata so much 
closer together as to promote a certain 
homogenization in many respects. There 
were still glaring inequalities where 
income was concerned, but its relative 
rise in the sectors that had previously 
been most unfavourably affected seemed 
to be easing the deepest-rooted of the 
customary tensions. A sort of broad 
intermediate stratum —by whatever 
name it was known— had improved its 
material living conditions, so that its 
members were able to accept as tolerable 
what were still very marked differences 
at the summit of the population pyra-
mid. It was not merely on account of 
their opponents' doctrinal riposte that 
the sociologists in question cherished no 
illusions whatever as to the existence of 
these limitations in their interpretation; 
and this prevented them from flatly 
denying the reality of the historical 
legacy of antagonism. They urged, how-
ever, how promising a sign it was that 
the reduced dimensions of the conflict 
or conflicts had allowed them to be 
institutionalized, and that the accep-
tance of this institutionalization by 
groups which had formerly been at 
daggers drawn not only attenuated 
thorny problems but gave temporary 
solutions increasing durability. 
But apart from and alongside this 
mitigation of the conflict -above all in 
labour matters- the relative expansion 
of education and the impact of the mass 
media (press, radio and television) had 
brought about a cultural homogenization 
that had never existed before. In Europe, 
despite the subsistence of the marxist 
parties and of trade-union forces, the 
workers seemed to have renounced their 
own differentiated culture and were 
increasingly adopting the 'bourgeois' 
way of life; in this case, moreover, no 
mention need be made of the United 
States, where such phenomena had 
hardly ever appeared. It is not surprising 
that in view of what happened during 
the three decades following the war, 
some writers should exalt that period 
both as the years of the renewed 
triumph of capitalism and as a time of 
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abounding vitality in the democratic 
regimes which harboured it; or that, 
conversely, many should have begun to 
feel some anxiety about the continuity 
of democratic life in face of the difficul-
ties that loomed up in it as soon as 
economic expansion encountered its first 
stumbling-blocks. Consequently, the 
thesis put forward by these authors is 
that of parallelism between economic 
development and democracy. During the 
past boom, the fact that the whole 
population shared in absolute terms in a 
higher level of well-being smoothed the 
way for democracy -notwithstanding 
the acknowledged institutional defects-
in so far as most of the people unhesita-
tingly put forward their new aspirations 
in the firm belief that these could really 
materialize. Conflicts of interests could 
be relatively successfully settled, and 
fuller satisfaction -restricted here and 
there for the moment- was only a 
matter of time and a steady course of 
political action. What would happen if 
the expansion which moderated the 
acerbity of the traditional struggles 
began to show signs of stagnation? 
The equation of wealth with plu-
ralism which for thirty years has been 
affirmed by some political scientists is 
reflected today in the parallelism, 
asserted by others with equal conviction, 
between economic development and 
democracy. Given this hypothesis, the 
impediments to democracy in the 
Western countries (including Japan) in 
the immediate past and predictably in 
the years to come would in their turn 
constitute a decisive factor in the con-
straints which for other reasons threaten 
to handicap economic development in 
the future. Naturally, the thesis is of 
supreme interest to the developing coun-
tries in the context of a dependent 
capitalism; its initial presentation, im-
plicit as yet, possibly had to be made, 
where those countries were concerned, 
in the doctrinal content of the admoni-
tions to 'modernize' themselves which 
were addressed to them. 
Although for the moment experience 
seems to confirm it, how far is this really 
an irrefutable thesis? For it not only 
draws attention to the difficulties of the 
democratic regime in .respect of the 
co-ordination or general running of the 
economy, but also underlines the demor-
alizing effects of both inflation and 
recession on political consciousness —the 
strength of the impact varying in the 
different social sectors- and, what is 
more, not merely in cases where reces-
sion and inflation occur together, but, 
above all, when as occasionally happens 
they alternate incomprehensibly. An 
analysis of the correlation between eco-
nomic development and democracy 
would entail following up a considerable 
number of presumed internal causal rela-
tions without whose proven consistency 
the correlation in question -like any 
other— would turn out to be a mere 
outward appearance or facade. In this 
lightning review of the main topic it 
would take up too much time to attempt 
any such thing. Let us provisionally 
admit that the correlation does show a 
temporary validity in relation to the 
historical juncture at which it has been 
observed. But in this case there are still 
two major questions which cannot be 
shirked. The first is posed by the fact 
that in the history of thought liberal and 
democratic ideas precede and are inde-
pendent of conceptions respecting eco-
nomic development. Vis-á-vis the doc-
trine we shall presently consider, to the 
effect that the legitimacy of the demo-
cratic regime is identical with the success 
and efficiency of the economic system, a 
vigorous reminder is needed that the 
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type of domination which characterizes 
the modern State and which in one way 
or another upholds both its liberal ele-
ments (political rights) and its demo-
cratic features ('representation' as a legal 
faculty) has its origin in the evolution of 
ideas on natural law before and after the 
dawn of the modern epoch. It is worth 
while to recall the chapter on natural law 
in Weber's work on juridical sociology 
(in no way a philosophical treatise), 
where it is shown that the basic postu-
lates of legal domination have their 
moment of faith consisting in the accep-
tance of charismatic inspiration. Accord-
ingly, no essential relation links the 
development and historical consolidation 
of the modern constitutional State and 
its subsequent democratic structure with 
the specific conceptions of the capitalist 
system, and consequently neither the 
rule of law nor the institutional crystalli-
zation of the egalitarian aspirations of 
democracy has been formulated or de-
fined as a function of what we now call 
economic development. Guarantees of 
the public and private rights of the 
individual date farther back-than con-
cern for the growth of the economic 
system. And while the legal rationale of 
the State undeniably has its parallel in 
the bureaucratic rationale of every kind 
of enterprise, it is no less true that the 
development of modern bureaucracy was 
in principle indifferent to the extension 
of democracy, although in practice fa-
vouring it within certain limits. The 
bringing into operation of the modern 
rule of law and of the democratic proces-
ses (by successive extensions of the right 
to vote) was never directly aimed at 
fostering economic development. Thus 
they might just as well thrive in coun-
tries where economic growth was slow as 
languish on the verge of defunction in 
others where it was rapid. The history of 
Europe is a clear case in point, since 
poverty was no bar either to the ardent 
desire for democracy or to the gradual 
improvement of the footing on which it 
was established. The history of the 
various parties, of their doctrines, and of 
the steady formation of political habits 
and traditions, has its fount of inspira-
tion in some of the European countries. 
The situation is not comparable with 
that of the United States, where entirely 
different conditions early permitted the 
consolidation of the wealth element. To 
the distinct and peculiar weight and 
continuity of these customs and tradi-
tions have been due, as already re-
marked, the differences in ability to 
tackle with greater or lesser degrees of 
success the difficulties faced in recent 
years by the democracies, some of which 
have kept going with exemplary vigour 
during the recent years of economic 
recession. And whatever the relationship 
of linkage or of independence between 
the political and economic institutions 
- a point we shall not discuss here-
there can be no doubt whatever that 
these deep-rooted potencies of political 
education will have the final say in 
determining not only the cultural con-
formation of the economic recovery still 
foreseeable in the next few years —with 
ups and downs, to be sure- but also the 
course to be steered by the major coun-
tries in the so-called quest for their 
'identity' expected to ensue in the 
coming decades upon the vacillations 
experienced during the earliest endeav-
ours to bring about the 'detente'. If in 
the immediate future the democracies 
manage to re-create their traditional 
physiognomies in this readjustment of 
their 'personality', they may very well 
show themselves capable too of reasser-
ting their 'will' to political continuity, 
even in the event —problematic as 
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regards dates and the nature of the 
factors that will trigger i t - of their being 
compelled to accept varying degrees of 
limitation of their economic develop-
ment, without on that account entering 
upon a definitely stationary phase. 
Although some maintain that the eco-
nomic structure of capitalism has less 
capacity for adaptation to such problems 
than that of socialism, it cannot be 
stated a priori as a certainty that the 
democratic political mechanisms of com-
promise, pliability and accommodation 
to the corresponding sacrifices will 
necessarily prove inferior to the rigidities 
which in the long run authoritarian bu-
reaucracy brings in its train. 
(iv) Narrowness of national bounda-
ries 
The last of the factors in the crisis of 
contemporary democracy which the 
various students of the subject are given 
to pointing out with unwonted unanimi-
ty is that deriving from the progressive 
contraction or shrinkage of national 
boundaries as against the breadth and 
interdependence of the world economy. 
The very definition of the State em-
bodied its 'territorial' character; its man-
datory powers and legal competence 
covered only a territory jealously demar-
cated by its frontiers. But in turn all 
activities carried out within that space 
by citizens of other countries were 
subject to its own regulations, which 
might equally well permit them, set 
limits to them or penalize them. And 
although this was true of any kind of 
State, those of a democratic character 
had to be able to count, up to a point, 
upon a minimum of participation of 
informed public opinion, both in the 
cases referred to and where external or 
international action was concerned —of 
course within the bounds of prudence. 
But the dimensions of what was mani-
festly becoming an increasingly global 
economy virtually shattered, along with 
the real efficacy of frontiers still theo-
retically intact, the nation-State's 
authentic capacity either to withdraw 
behind them and assert its sovereignty 
or, in practice, to prevent the internal 
repercussions of external activities, 
movements and pressures which it was 
impotent to control from its own power 
centre. The experience of the past few 
years shows that not even the most 
e c o n o m i cally powerful democratic 
States have been able to fend off the 
impact of the world around them. The 
case of the transnational corporations 
would seem the most striking example at 
first sight, although it is in fact far from 
being the most important and profound. 
Recent economic history is all too well 
aware of the successive waves of pres-
sures and counter-pressures which have 
surged up as the result of national 
economic policies, doubtless, moreover, 
quite outside the range of their original 
intentions. The economic recovery of 
Europe and Japan promoted by the 
United States created in subsequent 
years serious difficulties in economic 
relations between the parties concerned; 
just as later the repercussions of 
'exported' inflation made themselves 
felt, or the financial effects of the joint 
policies of the oil-exporting countries 
and the understandably defensive action 
taken by the customer nations. The 
territorial space of the State is contrac-
ting, and the democracies perceive in this 
shrinkage the evidence that they lack the 
mechanisms to intervene 'democrat-
ically' in the new and vaster arenas in 
which they are bound to act. Only 
against this general background can the 
problem of the 'transnational' be made 
intelligible. Far from creating, as some 
have maintained, a new type of interna-
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tional society in which the old sovereign 
State tends to disappear or sink into 
obscurity, they confront that State, to 
whose supreme authority they are still 
subject, with a good many problems 
both of political and of economic con-
trol. The issues raised by the creation of 
a new international economic order call 
with varying degrees of urgency for the 
establishment of international 'authori-
ties' in which the democratic govern-
ments need to participate, even if the 
equally democratic nature of those 
authorities is not defined and cannot be 
clearly and effectively established. 
The necessity for regional policies 
-accompanied by the constitution of 
regional units, economic and political in 
their ends- throws into strong relief the 
difficulty of broadening the constricted 
national spheres of action and the ill-
preparedness of the democratic regimes 
to transfer to the projected units the 
usual procedures of their own systems. 
The novelty of the situations created by 
economic interdependence takes politi-
cal thought and 'action by surprise with 
exigent demands on the imagination that 
do not present themselves in the same 
way in face of the other factors of crisis 
which have been longer known and 
studied. In this case the tasks of recon-
struction or restoration become real 
feats of inventiveness. 
(b) Liberal interpretation 
The ingrained propensity of the 
mind to classification led us to distin-
guish an interpretation described as 
liberal alongside the more functionalist 
and conservative approach we have just 
discussed. Strictly speaking, it is not so 
much a different interpretation as a 
nuance of the first, sharply apparent, it 
is true, in the drafting of the report 
referred to above. On the one hand, a 
marked feature of its critical orientation 
is the peculiarly liberal vein, quite 
distinct in European tradition from the 
concepts of democratic and egalitarian 
participation: influenced by Stuart Mill, 
for example, with his doctrine of the 
essentially representative nature of the 
democratic regime, or by Tocqueville, 
with his apprehensions that some day 
the advance of democracy might perhaps 
lead to the anti-liberal assertion of a 
drivingly authoritarian 'majority'. On the 
other hand, the sociological postulates of 
this sector of liberal thinkers diverge 
from a purely functionalist conception 
—always drawn towards the lodestar of 
order and social harmony— to stress, in 
contrast, not only the inevitability of 
struggle and conflict but even their 
positive value. Consequently, every 
liberal-democratic conception of the 
political system tends to accept as its 
point of departure the existence of 
opposing interests and ideological posi-
tions which cannot be finally reconciled 
at the dictates of an absolute truth 
possessed as such, but can only come to 
temporary arrangements, successively 
amplified to meet the needs of the 
moment, and worked out through agree-
ment, compromise and mutual modera-
tion of incompatible extremes. Hence 
the democratic value of procedures 
which, by allowing this form of give-and-
take, represent the institutionalization of 
the conflict; that is, the value of the 
liberal condition which consists in 
respecting, while it lasts, the validity of 
an opponent's interests and opinions. 
Any regime that believes itself to be in 
possession of the one and only truth and 
tolerates nothing in the way of dissen-
tion, thus precluding discussion that 
might lead to a relatively satisfactory 
agreement, is in principle unmitigatedly 
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authoritarian, even if it is democratically 
elected and appears to express the will of 
the majority. In face of the difficulties 
and dangers besetting contemporary 
democracies, the thinkers who still draw 
their inspiration from this vein of liberal 
tradition point out, first and foremost, 
what aspects of it are imperilled by 
excess or by defect. R. Dahrendorf s 
brief statement during the discussion 
recorded in the reports of the above-
mentioned 'Trilateral Commission' is an 
accurate resume of the position which 
-together with others, of course- he 
had already defended on more than one 
occasion. He deems inadmissible the 
acceptance of any proposal for 'remedial 
action' which in practice implies curtail-
ments or limitations of the democratic 
process, even though it may appear to be 
supported by a theory concerning the 
existence of dysfunctional elements in 
the system. A few brief comments will 
not be out of place in this connexion. 
The assumption of kinship between 
democracy and development would be 
admissible only if a much broader and 
more human conception of the latter 
were accepted —a conception released 
from the exclusive sway still exercised 
by that enthralling indicator, gross 
income. Is there no room for other 
forms of development at the service of 
human dignity and freedom? Curtail-
ment of the expansion of education 
because it proves unfavourable 
-especially at the higher level- to the 
purposes of development and social 
stability is a 'regressive' step for every-
one who regards education primarily as a 
'human right' to the enrichment of the 
personality. The tensions between the 
mass media and the government cannot 
be eased by stifling or circumscribing the 
media's cultural effects. And, lastly, one 
must have the courage to point out the 
dangers involved in any hypertrophy of 
the desire for 'participation' where its 
introduction leads in practice to the 
immobilization of the political process. 
In the democracy of today the tradi-
tional sense of 'citizenship* is the most 
important thing to save, even from the 
perils of what are often generous at-
tempts to perfect it. Liberal tradition 
must recognize and accept its own limits, 
since otherwise it runs the risk of 
crashing. These echoes of the great 
classics of political liberalism are a pre-
lude to the keynotes of a ' resto rati on is t' 
strain of thought which may perhaps 
gather strength in many quarters without 
needing to break off its profound dialec-
tical relation with the more ambitious 
revolutionary hopes cherished by the 
New Left, or rather with the ideals of 
the most serious section of contempo-
rary critical thought. 
(c) The New-Left interpretation 
But if we now go along with the New 
Left, its view of the crisis of contempo-
rary democracy takes us right out of the 
terrain in which we were moving. For it 
is no longer a matter of singling out the 
negative factors making for disintegra-
tion in order to cure bad habits as far as 
possible, but of showing that democracy 
is suffering from a fatal disease; which 
means that in any case its future must be 
envisaged on radically different bases. 
For in this type of thinking its essential 
malady is diagnosed as a complete break-
down of the principles of its legitimacy. 
And as the starting-point is once again a 
constitutive correlation between demo-
cracy and development, the criticism 
also extends to any other political sys-
tem which has thrown in its lot with the 
efficiency of development But for the 
moment let us confine ourselves to the 
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Western countries, where democracy and 
capitalism interweave the two strands 
—economic and political— in a single 
system. It is true that besides the New 
Left, with its plunge into sweeping cul-
tural criticism, other less heterodox 
currents of thought had in their time 
called the problem of legitimacy in 
question in a different way; that is, by 
denying its existence as such. According 
to the theorists of the democratic politi-
cal patterns proper to late or more 
mature capitalism, the entire system, 
concerned solely for its own stability, 
uses an institutional complex whose one 
and only objective is the loyalty of the 
masses, i.e., simply to be able to secure a 
state of apathetic obedience which is 
functionally satisfactory. Thus the tradi-
tional concept turns into something 
quite different, since fostering a belief iu 
the validity of a specific political order 
does not matter as much as promoting 
the renunciation of all notions of legiti-
mization (C. Ogge). 
The New Left neither contemplates 
such a renunciation nor abjures the old 
concept of legitimacy, but-alleges the 
brittle falsity of the principles to which 
at a given moment the more intelligent 
section of the bourgeoisie resorted. Inca-
pable of secularizing on a lasting basis 
the images of legitimacy of power for-
mulated by the Enlightenment -and 
founded on the abstract ideas of liberty 
and equality, almost sacred in their 
origins-, it resolved to transfer the 
legitimization of this 'political class' on 
to economic grounds. In an adroit resu-
me of the process, H. P. Dreitzel says 
that with the development of monopoly 
capitalism and State interventionism, the 
legitimacy of the ruling bourgeoisie and 
of persistent inequality was based on the 
steady growth of per capita income. This 
idea had already been hinted at in 
conservative criticism, which, while re-
cognizing a kinship between democracy 
and development, did not thereby imply 
any principle of legitimacy. All that was 
intended was an empirical interpretation 
of the fact that democratic organization 
nourished during a boom in economic 
growth; and this also warranted certain 
apprehensions as to what might happen 
if that growth were slowed up or 
brought to a standstill. 
The New Left, backed by a wide-
spread cultural criticism of our time, 
carries its negation of the dominant 
bases of political legitimacy to an ex-
treme, without waiting for this or that 
specific historical experience to demolish 
it completely and for any real belief in it 
to die out. The mission of any culture at 
a given point of time is to provide the 
grounds for the legitimacy of the politi-
cal system, to clarify the assumptions 
relating to the structure of personal 
motivations, and finally, to interpret in 
symbolical terms the natural limitations 
of human life. As Weber puts it: to offer 
some of the fundamental 'meanings' of 
man's existence. The aforesaid H. P. 
Dreitzel, in an excellent and concise 
summary of the cultural criticism of our 
day, including both the spontaneous 
movements- of the various 'counter-
cultures' and the philosophical analysis 
of leading thinkers, deals with each and 
all of these points, which we have no 
intention of dwelling upon here and 
now. Suffice it to bear in mind, as in the 
case of other aspects of New-Left think-
ing, that the analysis of present-day de-
mocracy, despite the vigour and generous 
impetuosity of its attack, is also brought 
up short when it comes to putting together 
the necessary proposals for reconstruction. 
What can be the substitute for industrial 
democracy —capitalist or socialist— and 
on what economic system can it be based? 
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It is common knowledge that the 
strictest conceptual refinements of philo-
sophical criticism have emphasized and 
perhaps demonstrated the aberration 
implied for civilization by the predomi-
nance of the instrumental rationale. The 
practical or perhaps historical rationale 
upon which depend the values people 
look to in everyday life -ethical and 
aesthetic values, values relating to com-
munity support and fraternity—, has 
been increasingly dimmed by the instru-
mentality of the relation between ends 
and means in science and technique, in 
economic development and in the tech-
nocratic expertise brought to bear on 
political decisions, leaving the ordinary 
human being painfully frustrated in his 
most intimate and most vitally essential 
aspirations. All the personal -i.e., 
psychological- 'malaise' of our time 
stems from the combination of the 
alienation imposed by institutions sub-
ject to the instrumental rationale with 
the anomie bred of the frustration of 
personal values (Dreitzel, Habermas, 
Schroyer, etc.). The welter of attitudes 
of protest in our time -ephemeral in 
some of their manifestations- represents 
the immediate expression of these ten-
sions in men of flesh and blood. Yet all 
this energetic movement of rebellion has 
so far been unable to find its indispens-
able functional equivalences in the deci-
sive sectors of the economic and political 
system. 
In face of the dangers of a breakup 
of the democracies of today, the 'con-
servative' and * liberal* positions seek to 
avert the disaster it would signify to 
throw overboard the values and the 
meaning which the 'old' institutions still 
preserve, defective as history may have 
shown them to be. 
Perhaps the movingly human exalta-
tion of the New Left may not be only a 
voice crying in the wilderness. In the 
future more and more strength may 
possibly be gained by a 'restorationist' 
type of thought, disposed to take the 
just criticisms of the iconoclasts into 
account in reinvigorating all the valuable 
elements of a civilization that cannot 
change in a single day, by magic art or 
by an act of religious conversion, its 
imperfect institutions, laboriously 
worked out over a long period of time. A 
necessary and patiently-sustained dialec-
tical union of such 'restorationist' 
thought with critical thinking may 
perhaps in due course establish the bal-
ance that is indispensable for reaching a 
constructive position. It is a question of 
the possibility of a new type of intelli-
gence -already making its appearance in 
some quarters- well-armed to meet as 
from now the challenge of the uncertain 
future. But this would lead us into a 
digression which for the moment must 
be cut short. 
(d) The implications of the post-
industrial society 
What is not a digression, although it 
may seem so in view of the time limits 
set to the forecast in these pages, is a 
reference —necessarily brief— to the 
future image of the society described as 
'post-industrial'. For if it should more or 
less approximately materialize, it would 
fall within our subject in the context of 
a question as to what type of govern-
ment would be appropriate for it. Would 
it be meaningful to speak of the survival 
of democratic organization in such a 
society? 
All those who nowadays devote 
some attention to a structure like this 
-even beginning with its most careful 
designer- are doubtful about the form it 
might presumably take. What, at bot-
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torn, does it involve: a new type of 
society or a transformation of the capi-
talist system? Post-capitalism, in short, 
or a post-industrial society? Despite 
these doubts, however, the writers in 
question do not categorically deny the 
presence of certain features which might 
in the near future stamp it as the latter. 
Thus what years ago was an English 
writer's fanciful presage of a 'brave new 
world' must be taken more or less 
seriously today. The idea of a Merito-
cracy, of a society with a rigidly pyrami-
dal structure, its differences of status 
predetermined by summing variations in 
the intelligence quotient to the result of 
special educational techniques for and 
exclusive to each IQ, would begin to 
look like the probable horizon of a 
civilization increasingly dominated by 
scient if ic knowledge. Accordingly, 
science and technique would constitute 
the dynamic force of such a future. 
The first signs of this transformation, 
assumed to be incipient, can be detected 
in the shifts that are taking place to a 
varying extent in the occupational struc-
ture, whose goal is the qualitative pre-
eminence of the services sector. Concur-
rently, or previously rather, the stepping-
up of demand for the requisite training 
has entailed a contraction of the un-
skilled labour force, within certain 
limits. This observation, statistically sub-
stantiated in most of the industrial coun-
tries, is the starting-point for the socio-
logical processing of data and the 
advance of speculative thought. To take 
development, for example: is it destined 
to depend more on qualitative than on 
quantitative factors? Will not that alone 
suffice to mitigate the problems posed 
by its possible limitations? For the 
purposes of the present article, however, 
it is the political aspect that is of most 
interest. If the essential basis of these 
and other changes consists in the increas-
ingly intensive penetration of life by 
science (Shelsky), their political and 
economic manifestations must be subject 
to its dominion. Will not the growing 
tendency for policy to be guided by 
scientific advisers ultimately hand over 
to specific experts the full and exclusive 
responsibility for all decision-making? 
Some people are beginning to see politics 
as a mere illusion. 
When D. Bell attempts to tackle this 
subject he is faced with the necessity of 
a choice between the technocrats and 
the politicians in the power centres of 
the future; and although he finally and 
explicitly casts his vote in favour of the 
latter, it must not be forgotten that the 
key feature of his picture of the strati-
fication of power is the predominance of 
knowledge, university research, technical 
know-how and skill, education, co-
optation, etc. In this connexion, the 
crucial issue seems to lie in the existence 
of co-optation as a means of access to 
power. For notwithstanding the depre-
ciation of technocracy as the summit of 
political power, it is not easy to conceive 
of democracy under a political regime in 
which co-optation takes the place of the 
free vote, unconfmed to exceptional 
circles. What sort of future would there 
be —near already, or more distant— for a 
democracy subject to such conditions? 
Is this a trend that must inevitably be 
reckoned with? 
Bell himself, apparently more a 
liberal than a democrat (let us not forget 
that according to him the sociologically 
fascinating riddle of a democratic society 
lies in the fact that as inequality de-
creases, resentment, in contrast, in-
creases), tends to find the solution in 
what would be a really just meritocracy. 
From the standpoint of participation, of 
the people's share in setting the course 
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of policy and in arrival at specific deci-
sions, the riddle would be posed in a 
different way, even if it had to be based 
on the existence of that resentment. 
How would it be best to deal with the 
resentments that find more or less explo-
sive expression in the current movements 
of protest? Would it not be a matter of 
The foregoing concise analysis of the 
crisis in the Western democracies—its 
common factors and divergent trajecto-
ries- was undertaken mainly under the 
aegis of intellectuals of a rightist inclina-
tion, since they were men who were 
more interested in the continuation of 
such a political system than in its down-
fall and termination. The factors indi-
cated by them as being at the root of the 
system's weaknesses therefore enable 
hopes of a good recovery to be main-
tained. It would be wearisome, however, 
to go yet again over the path already 
covered by examining at this point the 
proposals made for improvements (the 
necessary areas of action and the estab-
lishment of a generally-accepted agenda). 
All the negative elemen ts caused by 
imperfections of an institutional nature, 
whose manifestation have a long history 
behind them, are capable of being 
tackled through reforms inspired by ins-
trumental considerations, which are fully 
valid in this field: i.e., by the creation of 
new techniques of social organization 
which do not, however, claim to offer 
definitive solutions. In the case of the 
measures called for by the situation 
investigating their various causes -over 
and above the human condition— and how 
they could be rendered innocuous or toler-
able by being properly channelled? Thus 
we return to the subject of the difficulties 
of democracy, not only today but tomor-
row too. Let us content ourselves with 
what has been already touched upon. 
metaphorically described as 'the shrink-
ing earth', which affects all of us 
alike, bold efforts of inventiveness and 
creative originality are demanded which 
can, however, be facilitated by their 
co-ordination with those being initiated 
in the common quest for a new interna-
tional order. The prospects do not seem 
completely unpromising as long as the 
competitive phase of 'detente', which 
will continue to set the scene for quite a 
few years to come, is maintained with-
out serious deterioration, since this phase 
does not rule out the possibility of 
making some partial amendments, even 
though the completely new order to 
which the majority of the countries 
claim to be aspiring may not be achieved 
as quickly as could be desired. 
Furthermore, it has been assumed in 
this study that in all probability the rate 
of economic growth in the next twenty 
years or more will not be lower than in 
the decades prior to the current reces-
sion, although the more pessimistic 
observers foresee the occurrence of 
serious technical complications within 
the system. Even on the more favourable 
assumption, however, it would be a 
III. 
The revitalization of democracy 
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serious political error to persist in the 
belief that there is so close a correlation 
between economic development and a 
democratic regime that the latter 
depends entirely on the former. On the 
contrary, revitalizing the democratic 
system could be an excellent means of 
sustaining the continuity of develop-
ment, especially if the apparently un-
avoidable expansion of planning could 
be achieved by an effort -hardly as yet 
successfully attempted— to use the func-
tioning of the system of representation 
as a suitable mechanism for the parallel 
channelling of economic and political 
options: in other words, to try out a 
parliamentary political regime which 
would be at the same time an effective 
organ for democratic economic planning 
on the basis of the participation of all 
those concerned, reckoning in anticipa-
tion, of course, with their differences 
and antagonisms. Moreover, there is no 
reason why, in the time left, an attempt 
should not be made at a new type of 
development, less obsessed with quanti-
tative indicators and more interested in 
those of a qualitative nature. AVhat could 
be achieved in such a case through a new 
relationship between development and 
democracy would no doubt be of deci-
sive importance for the materialization 
of different and perhaps completely 
novel ways of life which might be able to 
survive even when the winds of prosperi-
ty drop and the possibility has to be 
faced of remaining becalmed, as some 
think might occur in the more distant 
future, in a stationary economic situa-
tion. Against such a time it would be 
desirable to conserve as far as may be the 
flexibility and capacity for adaptation 
and change which the democratic institu-
tions maintain as a matter of principle. 
The problem of the 'overload' of 
demands which seems to suffocate 
democratic governments with its weight 
is undoubtedly of a different nature, 
since its resolution does not depend 
entirely on the successful reconciliation 
of means and ends within a purely 
instrumental rationale. Nothing can fulfil 
that mission but a political education 
under the aegis of the practical and 
historical rationales which alone are 
capable of bringing about a change in the 
attitudes -currently impaired or down-
right perverted- of individuals and other 
social units with respect to the State. 
This is the problem, in reality, of a form 
of liberalism restored in social and tech-
nical conditions totally different from 
the traditional ones. It is a question 
intimately linked with that of the essen-
tial bases for the complete recovery of 
democratic life, i.e., the possibility of a 
full return to its authentic principles of 
legitimacy. The criticism of the New 
Left - o f sociological reflection as the 
critical conscience of our time—will 
remain as potent as ever if the transposi-
tion of the bases for that legitimacy is 
persistently condoned by unhesitating 
acceptance of the fallacy that they are 
identical with technical efficiency and 
success in running the economy. The real 
legitimacy of a State based on the rule of 
law, of its liberal function and of the 
organization of democracy as participa-
tion by the people depends on higher 
requirements relating to the meaning of 
life both in itself and in its humblest 
manifestations. We will not speak of 
happiness, because of its element of 
unattainability, but let us deal at some 
length with ways of consciously preven-
ting the occurrence of many avoidable 
ills. 
It was a positivist-type error when 
men like J. Schumpeter and M. Weber 
(who were never pure positivists) tried to 
defend democracy by presenting it as a 
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mere technical instrument for the elec-
tion of rulers. Indeed the latter, though a 
liberal through and through, went to the 
extreme of proposing his famous formula 
of a democracy operating through plebi-
scites. This is not the moment to go into 
lengthy historical explanations, however. 
Neither the rule of law nor the 
concept of democracy can be reduced to 
the status of mere instruments; and 
while the times we live in do not, 
perhaps, permit a return to the original 
justification of these two institutions, 
which was based on natural law (secu-
larized religious elements), it would at 
least seem necessary to make full use of 
all that still remains alive in these beliefs, 
in consonance with the various national 
credos (the nucleus of political values 
re f erred to by the functionalist 
M. Crozier as being, in the case of 
France, liberty and equality), and ini-
tiate a renewal of a political 'will' open 
to the anguished protest of needless 
frustrations. That is to say, a 'will* which 
really 'wants' to transcend instrumental 
rationalism and once again found the 
legitimacy of democratic rule on the 
supreme values of a form of human 
society which has a real significance for 
man and his community. The future of 
Western democracy depends on whether 
it can find itself again -renew its 'iden-
t i ty ' - in the same generous and enthu-
siastic spirit of endeavour as pervades the 
history of its origins. 
In a quite recent (1971) manual on 
political sociology which is widely read 
in academic circles, the author (Roger-
Gérard Schwartzenberg) entitles two of 
his chapters, in a telling antithesis, Sous-
développement et sur-pouvoir ("Under-
development and over-power") and Sur-
développement et sous-pouvoir ("Over-
development and under-power"). In them 
he expounds the doctrine -apparently 
valid at that t ime- that there is a 
correlation between the degree of eco-
nomic development and the degree of 
forcefulness of the political authorities. 
Countries in process of development, 
according to this writer, seemed to need 
energetic governments with plenty of 
mobilizing capacity if they were to 
develop fully, while in democratic coun-
tries at a high level of economic develop-
ment, in contrast, the public authorities 
tended to be singularly limp. Moreover, 
it usually happened that this weakness of 
the organs of the representative regime 
was accompanied by an outburst of 
strong reaction on the part of society 
against the obsession with purely eco-
nomic growth and against superfluous 
wealth (this was particularly so in the 
United States, during the decade when 
the so-called 'counter-cultures' were at 
their most flourishing). All this cannot 
be categorically dismissed as past history 
now. But neither can it be claimed, after 
these few years which have gone by, that 
the inverted correlation formulated 
above, with its undeniably impressive 
impact, can still be said to hold good. In 
the restricted compass of these pages it 
has been made clear, on the contrary, 
that in the richest democracies there has 
been an anxious call for more authority 
and a stepping-up of State intervention, 
destined to increase at the rate dictated 
by the expansion of economic planning 
in one form or another. The main 
concern of the observers cited and many 
others was that it should be possible for 
such conditions to exist without causing 
fatal disturbances in the established 
democratic regime. Most likely this will 
not happen, but only provided the regi-
me is willing and able to regain its past 
energy. 
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But does the opposite correlation 
hold good? Is there really no way open 
to the developing countries but the 
purely authoritarian path, with scarcely 
any possibility of representation of the 
people or popular participation? 
It was necessary to start from a 
factual observation regarding the Latin 
American countries: the observation that 
in many of them there is currently a 
propensity for authoritarian regimes 
which have at least temporarily sus-
pended the exercise of the liberal and 
democratic procedures previously known 
and practised. The very use of the word 
'suspended' indicates that there are reser-
vations about this development and that 
it does not represent a decision so 
indefinite as to appear definitive. Once 
again the countries which are in such 
circumstances display the contradiction 
inherent in the respective rationales of 
their political and economic institutions. 
This is of course nothing new for them, 
and it has been pointed out so many 
times before that there is no need to 
consider it here. Today this contradic-
tion is justified as the inescapable result 
of the tensions and conflicts precipitated 
by the effects of economic growth itself, 
which could not be resolved at the right 
moment through effective compromises 
-acceptable to the opposing groups con-
cerned as interim expedients— within the 
field of manoeuvre afforded by their 
already long-standing democratic and 
liberal institutions. Yet at the same time 
the significance of the role played by 
these institutions over the years has not 
been forgotten, nor ever completely 
denied. 
What interests us now, however, is 
not to go into this subject for its own 
sake,, but simply to follow up the 
pointers to future developments con-
tained in the foregoing pages. The Latin 
American countries as a whole have 
undoubtedly increased their wealth and 
well-being in the last few years; and if it 
is true that the foreseeable picture for 
the next two or three decades suggests 
the probable continuance of general eco-
nomic growth, they may reasonably be 
expected to enjoy a period of further 
enrichment, keeping the gap between 
them and the central countries the same 
as hitherto, or perhaps even narrowing it. 
If the likewise favourable prospect for 
the con tinuity of democracy in the 
capitalist countries is also confirmed, the 
model thus emerging could perhaps help 
to rub off the burrs of the authoritarian 
systems prevailing in the region. Pro-
vided, of course, it is understood that 
there is no question of interference or 
pressures -most of which have a nega-
tive effect— or of straightforward 
copying of foreign models, which is 
unthinkable in the case of countries now 
fully mature; but that rather it is a 
matter of the existence of a generalized 
political atmosphere which the Latin 
American nations could hardly fail to 
breathe too, given their birthright of 
membership of a common culture and 
their long-standing spontaneous links 
—economic, political, cultural, technical 
and scientific- with the great demo-
cracies whose future still holds out a 
promise. Of course, this is all subject to 
the general conditions of the world 
economic order, as long as it retains 
roughly its present character. 
The hazardous days in which we live 
do not warrant complete confidence in 
the instrument of persuasion: the cir-
cumstances which surround us are the 
driving force, and the action we can take 
depends on the way they turn out. It 
should not be forgotten, however, that 
in the consciousness of the Western 
countries still echo the dispassionate but 
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resounding words with which John decisive value of the human element in 
Stuart Mill concluded his deeply-reasoned shaping a lasting social order. Such an 
essay On Liberty: "The worth of a State, order is the real goal of futurological 
in the long run, is the worth of the studies, which give it pride of place over 
individuals composing it; . . . a State the prognostication - i n the last analysis 
which dwarfs its men . . . will find that 'reactionary'- of man's possibilities of 
with small men no great thing can really technological achievement and purely 
be accomplished". This conviction of the material satisfaction, his income and 
classic champion of liberalism, shared by resources, on earth. Any civilization which 
other thinkers of similar stature, exalts is dominated by concern only with these 
the supreme meaning of politics and the is indeed doomed beyond hope. 
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Comments by 
The author has succeeded in expressing, 
in a style as precise as it is elegant, a 
deep and sincere concern for the democ-
ratic and humanistic values. From the 
methodological standpoint, he begins 
"by seeking the support of studies writ-
ten in a conservative spirit" on the sub-
ject of the present and future of "the 
great capitalist democracies". The article 
may largely be regarded as an able 
synthesis of conservative interpretations, 
since basically they are not at variance 
with the brief remarks on the ideas of 
the 'New Left' or with the general con-
clusions. In point of fact, the statement 
of the problem in terms of a 'crisis of 
Western democracy' and of the urgent 
need for democracy to recover its real 
efficiency is conservative in the strict 
sense of the word, since it assumes the 
existence of a situation, prior to the 
current disturbances and threats, which 
should be preserved or restored. 
The author bases his summary of the 
conservative diagnosis primarily on the 
works of two North American thinkers, 
D. Bell, and R. Heilbroner, who voice 
their uneasiness about the political 
trends followed in their country during 
the past few decades and their anxiety as 
to the long-term implications. Here I 
want to discuss, in the empirical context 
of the recent history of the United 
States, only one aspect of the conser-
vative approach summed up in the article 
under review —but an aspect which is in 
my opinion of great importance for the 
argument. I refer to the 'overload' of 
demands made upon the contemporary 
State. 
John Durston 
To condense this argument even fur-
ther, the suggestion is that a principal 
cause of the "faulty operation of 
present-day democracy" lies in a recent 
overload of new demands and the conse-
quent State transfers and contributions. 
These claims would seem to constitute a 
deep-seated menace to the survival of 
democracy, not only inasmuch as they 
imply an increasing degree of State inter-
ventionism, which would do away with 
individualism and personal rights, but 
also because the fiscal impossibility of 
meeting all these demands for 'enti-
tlements' would inexorably lead to the 
collapse of the Public Household, or to a 
curtailment of democratic participation 
as the only possible safety measure 
whereby to conserve that very democra-
cy itself. 
But who are the 'individuals or 
groups' that are urging these excessive 
claims, and why are they doing so? 
Sometimes the 'civic consciousness' in 
general would seem to be the source of 
this view of things, according to which 
the new consumer aspirations have ac-
quired the character of entitlements. But 
the article makes it quite clear that it is 
not the general public that is responsible 
for this overload; it is the groups which 
have not been able to satisfy their de-
mands through the market that 'peremp-
torily' and "transcending the principle of 
equality of opportunities predicated at 
the start, in reality call for actual equali-
ty of benefits". It would hardly be an 
exaggeration to formulate the conclu-
sions of the argument as follows: certain 
groups and individuáis that have been 
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incapable (from limited intelligence or 
from laziness? ) of availing themselves of 
the equality of opportunities to satisfy 
their consumer wants, are now claiming 
as a right the satisfaction of their needs 
and wants by the State. These excessive 
demands are a threat to the stability of 
the democratic system itself; it would be 
partly imputable to the irresponsibility 
of these groups if the outcome to be 
faced were a fiscal crisis and the danger 
of an authoritarian and interventionist 
regime. 
The article offers no indication what-
ever of the identity of these groups. It is 
common knowledge, however, that in 
the United States this controversy was 
precipitated by the new demands and 
the new ways of putting them forward 
that emerged in the chronically poverty-
stricken sectors: the black and the 
Spanish-speaking populations; the indige-
nous groups; and the whites of Appala-
chia (miners, smallholders, migrant agri-
cultural workers), which, although mi-
norities, make up in the aggregate about 
one-third of the national population. But 
in the context of the operation of the 
socio-economic system in the United 
States, it is perfectly possible to inter-
pret these demands in a different way, 
which would lead us to conclusions very 
different from the concept of an 'over-
load of demands'. 
In the study by Medina Echavarria it 
is categorically declared that no attempt 
will be made to examine in detail the 
relation between political and economic 
institutions. Strictly speaking, it is a mat-
ter of divorcing 'political science' from 
'political economy'. Such a decision 
seems particularly regrettable in the pre-
sent case, for several reasons. The rele-
gation of economic factors (with the 
exception of the growth of the gross 
product) to the ceteris paribus of the 
analysis eliminates several economic pre-
mises as implicit bases of the political 
analysis; what is more, although the new 
demands of the groups in question cer-
tainly included their basic civil rights and 
some measure of proportional participa-
tion in the public decision-making pro-
cess in general, they were (and still are) 
mainly economic demands, as the article 
itself makes plain. By evading discussion 
of the relation between politics and eco-
nomics, the analysis discounts the possi-
ble economic causes of the crisis, besides 
ruling out solutions which would imply 
structural changes in the economic sector. 
But before considering the causes un-
derlying the underprivileged sectors' new 
demands and possible ways of dealing 
with them, let us briefly revert to the 
economic assumptions implicit in the 
conservative argument. The most obvi-
ous is the idea that real equality of op-
portunities exists in the United States. It 
is sufficiently proved and admitted that 
this aspect of the American Dream is 
largely a myth; although a certain very 
limited social mobility does exist, from 
which one-third of the population has 
been in fact excluded. More subtle are 
the implications latent in the assertion 
that the demands of these groups consti-
tute a danger for democracy because 
they are new, peremptory and likely to 
overstrain the capacity of the Public 
Household. In reality, the history of eco-
nomic development in the United States 
is in part the history of the demands and 
pressures brought to bear on the State 
by the economically powerful sectors, 
from the railroad owners and the great 
financiers of the past century, to indus-
trialists in the steel, motor-vehicle, petro-
leum and other sectors, and the giant 
defence industry of today. They attained 
most of their objectives in the shape of 
special policies and concessions, not be-
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cause these demands were fairer than 
those made by the deprived groups now, 
but because they were put forward by 
powerful sectors. Acceptable, too, are 
the nowadays traditional demands of 
certain professional organizations, such 
as the powerful American Medical Asso-
ciation, and, after an initial period of 
struggle for their rights, the great indus-
trial trade unions which constitute a sort 
of labour élite with exclusivist mecha-
nisms of its own. If these groups' de-
mands on the State have not exceeded 
the latter's capacity, it is because the 
present 'pluralist' political system repre-
sents precisely the product of the various 
demands and influences of the interest 
groups and the private sector. Obviously, 
the black and the Spanish-speaking po-
pulations, etc., have been traditionally 
excluded from the system as far as full 
economic and political participation 
goes. The mechanisms and causes of this 
discrimination are many and complex, 
and are mainly of economic origin, al-
though among them racism cannot be 
overlooked. 
The recent demands of these under-
privileged sectors are 'new' in several sen-
ses. In the first place, they are demands 
for State guarantees of a new type, res-
pecting equality in employment, several 
non-traditional services, etc. The history 
of these movements certainly began with 
demands for equality of opportunities, 
but it gradually moved on to demand for 
"actual equality of benefits", and this 
for two main reasons. Even if future 
generations were to have opportunities 
equal to those of the other sectors of 
society, one-third of the present popula-
tion would continue to be poor because 
it had not enjoyed that equality "at the 
start"; and, furthermore, it soon became 
clear that the measures applied (access to 
education, non-discrimination in em-
ployment, etc.) did nothing to under-
mine the real mechanisms of economic 
discrimination. In this context, the quo-
ta policy (in higher education, in em-
ployment, etc.) is essentially a "liberal 
solution", since it is not based on a full 
appreciation of the relation between the 
social classes and does not seek to bring 
about fundamental changes in the rele-
vant economic institutions. 
Secondly, the tactics employed by 
the underprivileged groups were also dis-
tinctly novel, especially during the 
1955-1965 decade, when the black civil-
rights movement was in its heyday: 
marches, boycotts, sit-ins, etc. Pressures 
on the State within the pluralist system 
are exerted through the local 'machin-
ery' of the two great traditional political 
parties, and through lobbyists or profes-
sional agents of the pressure groups and 
enterprises in Congress itself. 
In contrast, the 'passive resistance' 
tactics of the deprived groups produced 
their impact partly in the form of direct 
economic pressure, but much more 
through the moral confrontation of the 
general public with the realities of op-
pression. In this sense they constituted a 
tremendous stimulus to civic responsibil-
ity, a 'conscientization' with respect to 
the true principles of democracy —that 
is, the very opposite of a threat to such 
values. 
Lastly, since the new demands repre-
sent pressures on the part of groups 
which have always been outsiders in the 
pluralist democracy, they logically ex-
ceed the possibilities of the existing 
structure of the politico-economic sys-
tem. 
From this standpoint, therefore, in 
what sense could it be said that a public 
medical insurance scheme (to take the 
only concrete example of 'demands' 
given in the text) constitutes an overload 
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on the system, or a threat to democratic 
principles? Innovations of this type, 
based on concepts of social justice, 
would manifestly imply substantial chan-
ges in the distribution of income, eco-
nomic power and political participation, 
but it would be absurd to argue that 
they exceed the capacity of the United 
States economy. As regards the jeopardy 
in which increasing State intervention 
might place creative individualism and 
personal rights, it must be remembered 
that there are several forms of interven-
tionism. The intervention of powerful 
economic interests in public affairs is 
obviously not very democratic, nor, by 
definition, are the restrictions imposed 
by an authoritarian State. But popular 
I very much appreciated Medina Echava-
rria's article because of the decision and 
clarity with which he approached a 
problem of major significance and pro-
found relevance for us. 
However, there are two points of 
differing importance about which I think 
it would be useful to raise some doubts. 
The first, and the less important, con-
cerns the statement that the type of 
political system prevailing in the Western 
countries influences the trends towards 
change in the political systems of less 
developed countries. It is not clear 
whether, by this, he means that the 
democratic regimes might use their eco-
nomic power to impose political projects 
which they favour, or whether he is 
merely thinking of the spread of cultural 
patterns. In the first case I believe that 
the statement would be mistaken, at 
participation in decision-making is in it-
self a kind of interventionism in the eco-
nomic field through the State: it would 
make a difference to the operation of an 
economic system at present based on the 
decisions of the great enterprises, yet it 
does not necessarily imply any diminu-
tion of personal rights, much less a 'cri-
sis' of democracy. It seems more than 
ironical that some authors of function-
alist analyses, while rejecting at the out-
set solutions that imply structural eco-
nomic changes to resolve the problems 
and demands stemming from socio-
economic inequalities, find it perfectly 
acceptable to contemplate the possibility 
of a curtailment of democracy as the 
only remedy for this 'crisis'. 
least in its general sense, while in the 
second case the connexion, if there is 
one, in my view is only very slight. 
However, the main point that I wish 
to discuss is his assertion, firstly that the 
Western democracies are passing through 
a period of crisis, and secondly, that this 
crisis also affects the democratic ideal 
-Democracy with a capital D, under-
wood as a system of protection of per-
sonal rights and of channels for popular 
participation in the running of the 
republic. It seems to me that the author 
shares this conception of democracy, since 
he expresses concern lest the basic values 
of Western civilization may be threatened 
by the difficulties which these political 
systems are experiencing. I do not entirely 
go along with the first assertion mentioned, 
however, and I particularly disagree with 
the second, so let us analyse each in turn. 
Comments by Carlo Geneletti 
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First of all, is it really true that the 
Western democracies are in a state of 
crisis? The reply cannot be the same for 
every country. If by crisis we are to 
understand, as the Trilateral Commission 
does, a trend towards the breakdown of 
established authority, economic and fi-
nancial crisis, the division of society into 
openly conflicting groups, and a situa-
tion of increasing ungovernability: in 
short, if crisis means the growing illegiti-
macy of the power system, reflected in a 
high degree of instability, then few coun-
tries in Europe and North America could 
be considered to be in a state of crisis. 
France is not, and neither is Germany, 
whose political system has been stable 
since the post-war period. Could it be 
asserted that democracy is in a state of 
crisis in the United States? What basis 
would there be for this? 
In reality, it seems undeniable that 
the assertion is based almost exclusively 
on the Italian situation, and that the 
author, like the Trilateral Commission, 
considers Italy to be the weakest link in 
the chain, the test case for all the West-
ern democracies, so that the crisis of the 
Italian political system anticipates and 
points the way to the crisis of the other 
systems. 
I could hardly argue with the view 
that, in most of the developed countries 
suffering from economic crises, the con-
flicts between the executive and legisla-
tive powers over questions of efficiency, 
the difficulties of the traditional parties 
in channelling the demands of the social 
sectors, and the overload of pressures on 
the State for employment, benefits and 
services, have all increased the causes of 
social conflict, while at the same time they 
have reduced the possibilities of political 
negotiation between the opposing sides. 
Nevertheless, the chief aim pursued 
in the crisis of the Western political 
systems, to put the matter in somewhat 
idealistic terms, is the expansion of de-
mocracy rather than its abolition. Al-
though my view of European events 
from such a distance may be a little out 
of true, I have the impression that the 
kind of democracy which is in a state of 
crisis is the reduced and limited democ-
racy which has prevailed in the Western 
countries since the end of the war, and 
that the main trend of change to be seen 
in these countries is towards a democra-
cy of broader scope. 
Since the case of Italy is the most 
typical, I should like to refer to it at 
greater length, laying emphasis, of 
course, not so much on the individual 
case as on the possible theories that may 
be deduced from it. 
The political system still in force is 
the same, with some modifications, as 
that established at the time of the first 
elections of the republican regime, which 
brought about -because of the need to 
stimulate the economy, the Marshall 
Plan, and the presence of foreign 
troops— the exclusion of important 
groups of the population (the peasants in 
the south and a large part of the workers 
in the north) from political influence 
and from the benefits of economic devel-
opment. It is hardly necessary to recall 
that this exclusion was by no means 
bloodless, but was accompanied by riots, 
the rebellion of whole cities, sanguinary 
acts of repression, and political tension 
lasting for several years; it was only 
possible to bring the situation under 
control by recourse to such palliatives as 
agrarian reform and national and interna-
tional migration. 
Economic development was based 
chiefly on the compression of the do-
mestic market and the export of goods 
of intermediate technological content, 
whose prices were competitive in the 
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European market owing to the low cost 
of labour. It was only from the time of 
the "hot autumn" of 1969, and thanks 
to trade union pressure, that a significant 
redistribution of income in favour of the 
wage-earning class, with a consequent 
expansion of the domestic market, was 
achieved in Italy. Even so, the effect of 
unearned income, sinecures, and the 
State bureaucracy was to maintain situa-
tions of economic privilege incompatible 
with economic efficiency, and conse-
quently prejudicial to the welfare of the 
lower classes. 
With regard to the exclusion from 
political participation, suffice it to say 
that not until the 1970s was the Com-
munist Party (supported by more than a 
quarter of the population) admitted, 
albeit marginally, into the spheres of 
national political power, although not 
into municipal institutions, especially in 
the centre of the country. 
These brief observations show that 
the Italian democracy was an incomplete 
democracy. In saying this I do not wish 
to belittle its value, but only to affirm 
that its concept of legitimacy was limit-
ed and exclusive, and that there is still a 
long way to go in the process of democ-
ratization. 
To sum up, then, the crisis of the 
Western democracies does not signify a 
crisis of democracy. Carefully consid-
ered, the causes of this crisis, as specified 
by the authors whom Medina Echavarria 
quotes, also point to the same conclu-
sion: the conflicts between the supposed 
efficiency of the executive power and 
the responsibility of the legislative pow-
er, the crisis of the representativeness of 
political parties (including the Commu-
nist parties), the so-called overloading of 
the State with demands, which reflects 
the increased power of the lower classes 
to exert pressure, all indicate a state of 
conflict between the old order and the 
recent demands for popular participa-
tion, while at the same time they repre-
sent a transition towards new forms of 
democracy. For these reasons I do not 
share Medina Echavarria's basic concern. 
However, I do not want to leave an 
over-optimistic impression, either of the 
Italian situation or of the trends towards 
change. Although in my judgement it is a 
fact that the dominant trend of political 
change in Italy is towards the achieve-
ment of a more complete democracy, I 
do not wish to imply that political insta-
bility has a natural tendency to bring 
about this aim. If the conflict arising 
from the demands for participation by 
the excluded groups were to produce 
—as is feared by some leading Italian 
statesmen such as Amendola- a reaction 
towards an authoritarian political sys-
tem, democracy would obviously suffer. 
It is impossible, however, to attempt a 
prediction. 
I wish to conclude these comments 
with the following observation: I have 
tried to show that the crises of the 
Western democracies do not constitute a 
crisis of democracy, and I have referred 
principally to the countries most fre-
quently cited as examples: Italy and, to 
a lesser extent, France. I think, however, 
that the attention of those interested in 
the fate of democracy should move fur-
ther north, to Germany, where there 
does indeed exist a democratic system 
which respects democratic procedures 
and formalities, but where there are also 
signs of a dangerous tendency towards 
the reduction of civil rights. 
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Comments by Eduardo Palma 
The article hy Medina Echavarria is, in 
essence, an attempt to forecast the 
democratic regime's chances of survival 
in the near future in the countries where 
advanced capitalism prevails, and the 
consequent repercussions on the political 
systems of the Latin American countries. 
For the purposes of this intellectual 
exercise, the author does not conceal his 
preferences in respect of values, but 
acknowledges them, as a tribute to a 
humanistic tradition. 
Great care is taken to keep the prog-
nosis within such limits and of such a 
character as to overcome not only the 
difficulties inherent in separating events 
from their interpretation, or in linking 
up the possible futures depicted by 
authors and schools of thought with 
their specific ways of understanding 
society, but also the additional stum-
blingblock represented by what the 
author calls 'moot questions', where the 
fact of dealing with contemporary phe-
nomena makes it impossible to form 
conclusive opinions as yet. 
My brief and fragmentary remarks 
are directed towards three aspects of the 
article. The two basic comments relate 
to that part of its significance which, as I 
personally interpret it, is grounded on 
the 'history of the origins' of demo-
cracy, and to the author's conclusion 
with respect to the 'revitalization of 
democracy'. The other, which is of a 
more circumstantial nature, although 
linked to the foregoing questions, has to 
do with the technocratic modality in the 
Latin American regimes. The article in 
itself would suffice to warrant a respect-
ful silence; and if I venture to make 
these comments it is because I hesitated 
between the role of annotator -'gilding 
the lily'- and that of conformist -accept-
ing that there should be 'a voice crying in 
the wilderness'- until in the end my dif-
ficult choice lighted upon the former. 
With regard to the profound under-
lying significance of the 'Notes', I 
repeat the phrase I have already quoted: 
' the history of the origins' of demo-
cracy. This, in my opinion, points to a 
decisive question: there exists -probably 
beyond the domain of philosophy and in 
the realm of social science- a mass of 
historical information and various ethical 
value criteria for a theory of democracy 
as a political system. What is more, only 
democratic theory is meaningful as a 
continuous background extending past 
the time-limits of each particular politi-
cal regime. The shaping of democratic 
theory, as from its Greek origins, permits 
the accumulation of its own body of 
wisdom, when its content is abstracted 
from the vicissitudes of any given histori-
cal conjuncture. 
Conversely, the authoritarian regime 
does not possess a cumulative history 
that can be defined as development in 
various areas of human progress. In other 
words, authoritarianism begins and ends 
with itself. (It would take too long to 
give details here of the enterprise 
represented by Hobbes' Leviathan, or to 
specify the Roman origins of the institu-
tion of the Caesar, at the time of the 
decline in democratic customs.) 
Whenever a generation of intellec-
tuals wishes to turn over the page of the 
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complex tradition of the democratic 
school and open an unpublished book, 
the tensions that affect the content of 
their promise of utopia reappear under 
apparently novel guises. This is why - to 
refer to a case cited by Medina— Weber 
and Schumpeter, under the influence of 
the positivist spirit of their times, impov-
erished the content of the democratic 
dimension. It must be pointed out that 
Schumpeter's contribution was intended 
to design a transitional mode of opera-
tion for socio-economic regimes, while 
keeping the democratic political system 
constant. The refinement of his scheme 
of electoral competition between teams 
of leaders representing a government 
formula and individual candidates for 
power involves a functional interpreta-
tion of democracy which neglects certain 
of its aspects that are considered essen-
tial in our day. They imply a new con-
sciousness of individual rights, and an 
increasing concern for social autonomies 
and social consensus, matters classifiable 
under the head of social and political 
participation. It is only fair to the author 
of Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
to recognize that his positivist emphasis 
must be viewed against the background 
of his entire contribution to theory, in 
which democracy as he sees it is unques-
tionably assimilated to a way of life. 
A current trend in social analysis 
which postulates, in the Latin American 
scenario, an elective affinity between 
technocratic patterns and authoritarian 
regimes may, if the terms of reference 
are not clearly defined, tend to under-
mine the principles of authority and 
efficiency of democratic legitimacy. 
Medina speaks of these regimes and 
principles as 'moot questions', moot of 
course while investigation is still con-
tinuing, at least in Latin America, with 
respect to 'authoritarian-bureaucratic' 
regimes or the role of the technocratic 
estates. Here the simplest questions must 
be framed -who form the so-called 
technocracy, how, where and when? -
so as to explain in a more complex 
fashion its role in contemporary Latin 
American regimes. And this not from 
empiricism, but because up to now it is 
not clear at what level of development or 
growth and in what historical context 
technocratic bodies emerge as the power 
élite. Moreover, the mere presence of 
technocracy does not appear to be an 
inherent and exclusive modality either of 
authoritarian or of democratic regimes. 
The article under consideration con-
cludes with some reflections on the 
rev i tal iz at ion of democracy within the 
next two or three decades, on the as-
sumption of continuance of the interna-
tional detente. The form in which this 
revitalization is presented is neither more 
nor less than the democratic planning 
towards which the author's thinking has 
long been directed. One need not be 
unduly prejudiced to imagine some 
replies to the proposal. Nevertheless, let 
us acknowledge that among those most 
disposed to support this 'tomfoolery' it 
has been the object of verbiage rather 
than of methodical research, much less 
of attempts to introduce it. 
The issue involved in the proposi-
tion, however, is and will continue to be 
crucial. The growing tendency of social 
groups to programme their activities 
means already that the existence of 
order -somewhat more exacting than 
equilibrium within an accepted disorder-
will entail bringing political and eco-
nomic institutions into operation under 
a national planning system. There is no 
guarantee that this will be democratic. 
The futurological debate does not make 
for optimism while it continues in its 
present style of parallel lines of thought. 
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The phrase 'parallel lines of thought' is 
intended to highlight the widening gap 
between scientific monism and social 
criticism. The two ways of thinking man-
ifest no empathy whatsoever: they keep 
their discourses strictly parallel. No 
search has been made for the procedures, 
mechanisms, instruments and institu-
tions which could really reconcile, 
within a common social technology, the 
political demands for participation with 
the canons of economic and social 
theory. I have deliberately assumed that 
the science and the criticism to which I 
refer are optimum products in their re-
spective branches of knowledge. I know 
The power of suggestion is one of the 
many virtues of José Medina Echava-
rria's alert and sensitive thinking. His 
reflections enrich analyses and formula-
tions, and go straight to the heart of any 
problem; hence their perusal is always 
stimulating. In this sense, his article 
"Notes on the future of the Western 
democracies" brings us face to face with 
what are some of the most vital issues of 
the contemporary world, since they 
relate to the destiny of the human race, 
yet does not on that account disregard 
the specific characteristics of the Latin 
American process at this critical juncture 
in the region's history. 
Out of the compact sheaf of ques-
tions laid before us with so much 
acumen, we will take up two. The first 
relates to the author's timely reminder 
that "in the history of thought, liberal 
and democratic ideas precede and are 
independent of conceptions respecting 
that this is not always the case; in that 
event, their mutual estrangement paves the 
way for all the obfuscations proper to those 
who lack a common term of reference. 
To conclude, if the study were just 
one more testimony to the existence of 
an unaccomplished task, that merit alone 
would qualify it as a real contribu-
tion. But since the author bases these 
' Notes', as he modestly calls them, on 
vigorous backward- and forward-looking 
cogitations upon the future outlook for 
democracy, they are an invitation to put 
into practice "the ways of consciously 
preventing the occurrence of many 
avoidable ills". 
economic development": that is, they 
cannot be validated only by the success 
-nor, therefore, refuted by the failure -
of their capacity to meet the require-
ments of increased well-being. The diffi-
culties habitually encountered by all 
attempts to reconcile 'democracy and 
development' are not observable in the 
under-privileged regions alone (as might 
be presupposed at a very rapid glance, in 
view of the growing institutional insta-
bility of the developing countries, and 
the frequency with which they deviate 
or debouch into authoritarianism). 
Rather do they constitute, as Medina 
Echavarria stresses, a key concern of 
political thinkers everywhere and of all 
tendencies, for they underlie the whole 
spectrum that stretches from conserva-
tive interpretations to those of the so-
called 'New Left'. What is more, "the 
criticism also extends to any other politi-
cal system which has thrown in its lot 
Comments by Gregorio Weinberg 
COMMENTS BY GREGORIO WEINBERG 147 
with the efficiency of development". In 
short, neither by their origins nor by 
their future are the concepts of 'demo-
cracy' and 'liberalism' necessarily linked 
to those of capitalism as an economic 
system, and much less still to the effi-
ciency criterion, whatever the code of 
values selected as a point of reference. 
To corroborate the conclusions of 
the foregoing paragraph recourse to 
history will suffice. We will dismiss 
straight away the facile arguments of 
those who attempt to impugn the 
concept of democracy from its very 
origins, and to that end recall only that 
it was confined to a small number of 
'citizens' and excluded slaves and for-
eigners, even though these latter some-
times formed the numerically largest 
groups. They forget, however, that it has 
been undergoing elaboration and enrich-
ment from the time of the Greek city-
State to our own day. In any case, such 
reasoning is a very shaky foundation for 
criticism of what are still fruitful ele-
ments in the ideas of Plato and Aristóte-
les, since stating the question in those 
terms means shirking the real issue, 
which is not a matter of justifying a 
restricted democracy such as that un-
doubtedly was, but of creating the neces-
sary and adequate conditions for pro-
gressive expansion of the range of 
participation (in addition to the guaran-
teeing of rights) until it is made really 
universal. 
But let us look at another example 
closer to ourselves. Spinoza, for instance 
- to cite one of the greatest thinkers of 
the modern world, and perhaps one of 
the least remembered-, in his Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus, when he is ana-
lysing the various known political re-
gimes, considers democracy to be the best 
of them, for its government is based on 
reason, since in it —in democracy— 
sovereignty is vested in the person of the 
human individual. Still according to 
Spinoza, in the republic (that is, the po-
litical community), authority (for him a 
synonym of legitimate power) rests on 
the jus naturale (the law of nature, i.e., 
the law of self-preservation, and preser-
vation of one's rights, not only as a 
reality but also as a potential), which 
does not, to be sure, fail to recognize the 
jusjudiciale (the law of society), but sees 
it as a means of safeguarding the idea of 
tolerance. Shortly afterwards a decisive 
contribution was to be made to the theo-
retical formulation of this last concept 
by John Locke, precisely one of the 
greatest architects of liberalism, in whose 
system the right to own property came 
to be given a privileged place. But at no 
point in his reflections, formulated 
—obviously— during the century of abso-
lutism and of the consolidation of na-
tional states, does Spinoza resort to eco-
nomic arguments to lead up to his con-
clusions, still less to justify them. Thus, 
in this seven tee nth-century rationalist we 
find a forerunner already concerned with 
"secularizing on a lasting basis", as 
Medina Echavarria puts it in relation to 
the following century, "the images of 
legitimacy of power formulated by the 
Enlightenment". Consequently, the 
fundaments of the democratic society 
are legitimized in ways perceptibly diver-
gent from the paths followed by those 
who pursue the same end today via the 
'instrumental rationale'. 
This is not the place to explore the 
background of the ancient concept of 
'democracy' or of the more modern idea 
of 'liberalism'; nor to stress their distin-
guishing marks or to linger over an 
attempt to discover the intentions of 
those who confuse them. What is of in-
terest, in our opinion, is to underline the 
fact that they have a history, since this 
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criterion, on the one hand, facilitates 
their dissociation from specific regimes; 
and, on the other, makes it possible to 
relate them —especially the first— to a 
very old tradition of incessant search for 
the appropriate means of satisfying 
human aspirations, which, of course, 
transcend those concerned with "purely 
material satisfaction". Nor does this ap-
proach shut out the potentialities of 
Utopian thinking, which, although it 
does not hazard an interpretation of 
existing realities (a task, moreover, im-
possible for it, since strictly speaking it is 
not analytical), nevertheless can consti-
tute a proposal for action. Provided that, 
as Ernst Block insisted, the utopia meets 
the twofold requirement of being satis-
factory as a theory and efficacious as a 
praxis. 
The second question, which we shall 
touch upon very lightly, is a reversion to 
the theme of what Medina Echavarria 
calls the "narrowness of national bound-
aries" and the political problems it in-
volves, ranging from the constitution of 
regional units to the exploration of the 
possibilities for "establishing interna-
tional authorities". His remarks in this 
connexion suggest the innumerable diffi-
culties raised in relation to the problems 
of democracy and its future - the focal 
point of the article under discussion— as 
well as the tests to which democracy is 
and will continue to be subjected. On 
our part we would venture to assert that 
the depth of the contemporary crisis 
could perhaps also be sounded from 
another point of view, not indeed 
completely divorced from that of Medina 
Echavarria, but expressed in other terms 
and approached on a different level. 
Man in our day has witnessed a con-
vulsion in his categories of space and 
time -not to mention others- whose 
dimensions and characteristics generate 
much of his malaise (to refrain from 
speaking of a concept so mishandled and 
at times equivocal as that of 'anxiety'). 
These assertions may be illustrated by 
recalling three significant moments in 
the course of history. 
(a) The first consists in the transi-
tion from the Greek city-State to the 
Hellenistic empire, which generated a 
veritable civilization, distinguished by its 
brilliant lights and the uncompromising 
darkness of its shadows, in which strong 
individualism existed alongside a no less 
intense cosmopolitanism, engendering a 
rootless human being who looked on in 
perplexity at the rapid ousting of the 
culture of the cities by another with 
claims to universality (although its whole 
'world' was a modest sixteenth of the 
planet). 
(b) The second was the Renaissance, 
when within the short space of a few 
decades geographical discoveries giganti-
cally enlarged the earth, and the theories 
of Copernicus deprived it of the privi-
leged place it had held in the Ptolemaic 
system which had pervaded the western 
Weltanschauung through and through. 
(The known evidence seems to suggest 
that for sixteenth-century man the diffi-
culty of grasping a fact so astounding as 
the existence of the Antipodes was 
apparently much greater than any that 
our twentieth-century contemporary 
finds in coexisting 'naturally' with 
manned spacecraft. Similarly, for the 
former -living in a markedly hierarchical 
society— it must have been easier to 
accept in a fatalistic and passive spirit 
the prevalence of poverty, famine or 
plagues, perhaps to some extent made 
tolerable then by their very inevitability, 
than for us -children of a more affluent 
society, vigorously mobile and fluid- at 
a time when historians as conservative 
and ethnocentric as A. Toynbee can say 
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that in view of our economic situation 
social injustice is becoming avoidable 
and therefore intolerable.) 
(c) The third is our own time, when, 
again in an interval of only a few years, 
contemporary man has sallied forth into 
the universe (as witness his daring feats 
of space travel), and in the laboratories 
has explored the microcosm of the atom 
and succeeded in liberating energy by 
splitting it. The particular form of 
human tension deriving from confronta-
tion with the macrocosm and the micro-
cosm, combined with many others, such 
as those stemming from the speeding-up 
of the tempo of history, the disruption 
As one has learned to expect from an 
essay by this author, the text is so 
tightly knit and deals so judiciously with 
the questions it sets itself that it leaves 
few loopholes for comments. On reread-
ing one finds discreetly suggested and 
dismissed what one was at first tempted 
to point to as omissions. The main fac-
tors bearing on an uncertain future and 
the reasons for hoping that pluralist 
democracy will hold its own against 
' authoritarian democracy' and 'peo-
ple's democracy' (since the future of the 
word 'democracy' as a symbol of legiti-
mation for all kinds of re'gimes seems 
assured) are here. The essay will start 
each reader on his own mental explora-
tion, possibly leading to other essays 
rather than comments. 
The author makes use of one progno-
sis borrowed from certain economists to 
make somewhat smoother the future of 
pluralist democracy: that the central 
of most of man's frames of reference, 
and the doubts consequently cast on 
many of his accepted values, constitute 
additional elements that no searching 
criticism of the culture of our age can 
afford to disregard. On the contrary, it 
must take them in conjunction with the 
motives of concern for the future of 
democracy —as enunciated by Medina 
Echavarria- in order to understand that 
if the contemporary world has new 
dimensions and new contents, it also 
needs new tools and new attitudes for 
their analysis and comprehension. All of 
which represents an unparalleled challenge 
to man's intelligence and imagination. 
countries can expect more than twenty 
fat years of economic growth in which 
to reform their styles of development 
and prepare for a longer-term future in 
which such growth will no longer be 
feasible, in which 'development' will 
have to focus on quality rather than 
quantity. Are these twenty-odd fat years 
either probable or desirable? As to the 
probability, one can surmise a predispo-
sition on the part of crusaders for a 
'new international economic order' to 
suppose that the central countries are 
going to be in a position to meet the 
demands now being made on them 
without undue strain. In view of the 
multiplicity of problems with which the 
central countries are now contending, 
however, the odds in favour of such a 
future seem to be poor. As to the desira-
bility, an additional twenty-odd uninter-
rupted fat years would almost inevitably 
mean a relapse into complacency; they 
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would entrench still deeper the life styles 
of the consumer society, possibly even 
more in the semi-developed peripheral 
capitalist countries than in the centres 
themselves. Neither in pluralist democra-
cies nor in authoritarian regimes domi-
nated by beneficiaries of the consumer 
society can one expect the partnership 
of a Pharaoh plagued by bad dreams and 
a futurological Joseph to plan realistical-
ly for the lean years. 
Perhaps the best that can be hoped 
for and also the most probable immedi-
ate future is one neither so dynamic 
economically as to strengthen the mo-
mentum of growth for its own sake nor 
so catastrophic as to overstrain the capa-
city for adaptation of the pluralist demo-
cracies; in other words, a future not too 
unlike the present. A learning process is 
under way in the centra! countries that 
are also pluralist democracies, paradoxi-
cally combined with a paucity of in-
spiring leadership and images of the 
future capable of mobilizing consensus. 
There are grounds for hope that the 
accompanying debate and the concomi-
tant groping for different life styles, 
while confused and conflictive, are gene-
rating a capacity to reach democratically 
new positions regarding social equity, 
protection of the environment and hus-
banding of resources. Already some 
aspects of life styles and some demands 
made on the State have changed in ways 
that would have been inconceivable a 
few years ago. The question remains 
whether the continual responses to new 
challenges and sources of insecurity can 
proceed with a reasonable degree of flex-
ibility, innovativeness and perceived par-
ticipation in decision-making, or whether 
the societies will become enmeshed in tech-
nically-based regulations and legal protec-
tions of group rights so complex that plu-
ralist democracy will become irrelevant. 
It is possible that the 'new form of 
intelligence' that Medina points to and 
then sets aside for future exploration 
will mean a certain devaluation or delim-
itation of political democracy -a ver-
sion, approached through devious histo-
rical paths, of Marx's replacement of the 
State by the 'administration of things' 
or Christ's injunction to 'render unto 
Caesar that which is Caesar's.' That is, a 
technocratic administration might be 
accepted with indifference as long as it 
does not demand too much nor make 
too egregious blunders, while the people, 
whether individualistic or communi-
tarian, would place its main interests 
elsewhere. The preconditions would 
include achievement of an acceptable 
level of consumption and services for at 
least the visible majority of the popula-
tion, consensus between the technocrats 
and the articulate parts of the popula-
tion concerning the limits of growth and 
the futility of national aggrandizement, 
priority for interests that can be satisfied 
without significant increases in produc-
tive capacity: sex, sports, meditation, 
rituals. 
The implications for the rest of the 
world of a future of 'cultural mutation' 
(the term proposed by Alain Touraine) 
within pluralist democracies in the cen-
tral countries are obviously complex. 
The likelihood that these countries will 
presume to act coherently as dei ex 
machina to bring into being a new inter-
national economic order diminishes. One 
can expect a turning inward combined 
with a projection on the rest of the 
world of the issues being debated within 
the national societies. Vicarious utopian-
ism -the disposition to identify and aid 
new styles of development in poorer and 
supposedly simpler societies- will coex-
ist with rejection of responsibility for 
the problems of the rest of the world. 
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Public censoriousness toward national 
societies that combine dynamic econom-
ic growth with highly uneven distri-
bution and disregard of environmental 
damage, under the control of authori-
tarian regimes, will coexist with tangible 
signs of favour for such patterns from 
the transnational enterprises and lending 
institutions. 
Under these circumstances, the Latin 
American national societies cannot ex-
pect to receive unambiguous signals from 
the pluralist democracies in the central 
countries; different groups will empha-
size the signals that correspond to their 
own preferred style of development. At 
the same time, as semi-developed coun-
tries that are tributaries of the same 
systems of political organization and cul-
ture as the central countries, struggling 
with intensified versions of the same 
crises, the Latin American countries 
transmit signals that have a real impact 
in the central countries; in particular that 
the penalty for failure on the part of plu-
ralist democracy to cope with such crises 
may be the fitting of the national societies 
to an authoritarian bed of Procrustes. 
